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MISDEMEANORS BY THE NUMBERS
SANDRA G. MAYSON *
MEGAN T. STEVENSON **
Abstract: Recent scholarship has underlined the importance of criminal misdemeanor law enforcement, including the impact of public-order policing on communities of color, the collateral consequences of misdemeanor arrest or conviction,
and the use of misdemeanor prosecution to raise municipal revenue. Despite the
fact that misdemeanors represent more than three-quarters of all criminal cases
filed annually in the United States, however, our knowledge of misdemeanor case
processing is based mostly on anecdote and extremely localized research. This Article represents the most substantial empirical analysis of misdemeanor case processing to date. Using multiple court-record datasets covering several million cases
across eight diverse jurisdictions, we present a detailed documentation of misdemeanor case processing from the date of filing through adjudication and sentencing. The resulting portrait reveals a system that disproportionately impacts poor
people and people of color. Between 2011 and 2016, each jurisdiction studied relied on monetary bail, which resulted in high rates of pretrial detention, even at relatively low amounts, and imposed court costs upon conviction. There were substantial racial disparities in case-filing rates across locales and offense categories.
The data also, however, highlight profound jurisdictional heterogeneity in how
misdemeanors are defined and prosecuted. The variation suggests that misdemeanor adjudication systems may have fundamentally different characters, and may
serve different functions, from place to place. It thus presents a major challenge to
describe and theorize the contemporary landscape of misdemeanor justice. At the
most fundamental level, the variation calls into question the coherence of the very
concept of a misdemeanor and its role in the criminal justice system. As apprecia-

© 2020, Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson. All rights reserved.
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
** Assistant Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School.
The authors are exceedingly grateful for valuable input from Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eisha Jain,
Jennifer Laurin, Sasha Natapoff, John Rappaport, Jenny Roberts, Ronald Wright, the organizers and
participants of the conference Misdemeanor Machinery: The Hidden Heart of the American Criminal
Justice System, held at Boston University School of Law in November 2017, and attendees of the empirical scholarship panel at CrimFest 2018; as well as for the outstanding research assistance of T.J. Striepe,
UGA School of Law Associate Director for Research Services, and of UGA law students Savannah Harrison, Chris Keller, Emily McCutcheon, Blake Ogden, Alex Pilgrim, and John K. Tomes.
NOTE: Because some platforms do not reproduce images, we have archived all graphics herein at
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/61-3/mayson-stephensongraphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3X5-QJPA].

972

2020]

Misdemeanors by the Numbers

973

tion for the significance of low-level law enforcement builds, we urge scholars and
policymakers to attend carefully to the complexity of this sub-felony world.

INTRODUCTION
On April 12, 2018, two black men were arrested for sitting in a Philadelphia Starbucks. 1 The charge: trespassing. 2 The men were waiting to meet a
friend, and when they declined to make a purchase or leave, the manager
called the police to have them removed. Had the two men actually committed
criminal trespass? Maybe; the relevant statute leaves room for argument. 3 The
more important question is whether waiting for a friend in a Starbucks is worthy of arrest, and whether it would have resulted in arrest had the men been
white.
When a video of the incident was posted to the internet, the response was
swift and dramatic. The video was viewed almost ten million times in three
days. 4 Protesters descended on the Starbucks store. Starbucks CEO Kevin
Johnson traveled to Philadelphia to offer a face-to-face apology to the two
men, and on May 29, Starbucks closed 8,000 stores for the afternoon so that
employees could attend racial-bias training. 5

1
Matt Stevens, Starbucks C.E.O. Apologizes After Arrests of 2 Black Men, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/15/us/starbucks-philadelphia-black-men-arrest.html [https://
perma.cc/M867-RQAG].
2
Id.
3
The law provides that “[a] person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or
privileged to do so, he . . . remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by: (i)
actual communication to the actor . . . .” 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503(b)(1)(i) (West
2019). On the one hand, the men remained in the Starbucks after the manager ordered them to leave,
and presumably knew that the Starbucks was private property. On the other hand, the men might have
reasonably believed they had the right to remain because Starbucks holds itself out as a gathering
place open to the public. Moreover, Pennsylvania law provides a defense to trespass if “the premises
were at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions
imposed on access to or remaining in the premises.” Id. § 3503(c)(2).
4
The video, posted to Twitter by a bystander, had over nine million views after three days on the
internet. See M.L. Nestel, Handcuffing of 2 Black Men in Starbucks in Philadelphia Called ‘Reprehensible Outcome’ by CEO, ABC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/News/black-menwalked-starbucks-cuffs-trespassing/story?id=54470047 [https://perma.cc/6JYB-WDZL]; see also
Melissa “That White Lady” DePino (@missydepino), TWITTER (Apr. 12, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://
twitter.com/missydepino/status/984539713016094721?lang=en [https://perma.cc/2DR3-LSZS].
5
Bill Chappell, Starbucks Closes More Than 8,000 Stores Today for Racial Bias Training, NPR
(May 29, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/29/615119351/starbucks-closesmore-than-8-000-stores-today-for-racial-bias-training [https://perma.cc/ZKM6-4EHW]; Prudy Gourguechon, The Psychology of Apology: How Did Starbucks’ CEO Kevin Johnson Do?, FORBES (May
6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/prudygourguechon/2018/05/06/the-psychology-of-apologyhow-did-starbucks-ceo-kevin-johnson-do/#1325ea88ac8d [https://perma.cc/WWN5-DHZ2].
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The Starbucks saga illustrates a major shift. After decades of neglect, 6
misdemeanors have entered mainstream criminal-justice debates. By definition, misdemeanors are low-level crimes, many of which have only an attenuated relationship to public safety. 7 Compared to felonies, misdemeanor penalties are light: fines, fees, probation, and/or short jail terms. 8 There is, however,
growing awareness that the consequences of misdemeanor arrest or conviction
are far from trivial. 9 Money bail keeps those who cannot afford to post it detained for days, weeks, or months before their case is resolved. 10 Fines and
fees imposed for a misdemeanor conviction can be a massive burden for the
poor. 11 Probation is intrusive, and failure to comply with all conditions of probation can land a person back in jail. Even short jail sentences can be highly
destabilizing; a few days in jail can lead a person to lose her job, housing, or
custody of her children. 12 Beyond the criminal justice system, a misdemeanor
arrest or conviction may trigger a host of collateral consequences, including
deportation, barriers to employment, and ineligibility for some public benefits. 13

6
Misdemeanors have historically received little attention from criminal justice scholars, activists,
or the media. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012)
[hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012] (suggesting that misdemeanor convictions should receive
more attention and due process than they are presently given). There are notable exceptions where
scholars have delved into misdemeanors and their consequences. See generally, e.g., MALCOLM M.
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT
(1992); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992).
7
See Misdemeanor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining misdemeanor as a
“crime that is less serious than a felony”).
8
See id. (listing the potential punishments stemming from a misdemeanor conviction).
9
See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012, supra note 6, at 1315 (noting that although misdemeanor defendants “are largely ignored by the criminal literature and policymakers, they are nevertheless punished, stigmatized, and burdened by their convictions in many of the same ways as their felony counterparts”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 277 (2011) (explaining that misdemeanor convictions have repercussions beyond the court-imposed punishment).
10
See Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/W99E-69Z2] (reporting on the collateral effects
stemming from indigent defendants’ inability to post bail).
11
See Jessica Brand, How Fines and Fees Criminalize Poverty: Explained, THE APPEAL (July 16,
2018), https://theappeal.org/fines-and-fees-explained-bf4e05d188bf/ [https://perma.cc/ZDT9-CBCA]
(detailing the long-term consequences of court-ordered fines and fees given to low-income individuals).
12
See Roberts, supra note 9, at 287–89 (discussing the ramifications of jail time regarding housing and employment opportunities); Eli Hager & Anna Flagg, How Incarcerated Parents Are Losing
Their Children Forever, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2018/12/03/how-incarcerated-parents-are-losing-their-children-forever [https://perma.cc/4MH8-NG42]
(reporting on the difficulty incarcerated parents face in keeping custody of their children).
13
See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012, supra note 6, at 1316–17 (describing collateral consequences that misdemeanor convictions can trigger); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor Sys-
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The cumulative impact of these consequences is profound, because the
misdemeanor system is vast. There are approximately thirteen million misdemeanor cases filed each year, representing more than three-quarters of all criminal cases. 14 The extraordinary case volume, informality, and perceived low
stakes of misdemeanor proceedings also make the system particularly susceptible to certain kinds of distortion. Amorphous public-order offenses allow for
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 15 Even well-intentioned policing
that targets poor neighborhoods disproportionately funnels the poor into misdemeanor court, where the routine imposition of fines and fees compounds the
disparate burden. Because misdemeanor pretrial detainees can often plead
guilty to go home, pretrial detention influences case outcomes and undermines
confidence in the accuracy of the adjudicative system. 16
The new wave of attention to misdemeanor justice has exposed and explored these pathologies. 17 The Department of Justice raised the profile of
tem, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013) (noting that misdemeanor convictions “can affect
future employment, housing, and many other basic facets of daily life”).
14
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [https://perma.cc/J4ME-7YXH]; Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G.
Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2018).
15
Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (affirming that Chicago’s gangloitering ordinance violated due process because it did not provide “sufficiently specific limits on the
enforcement discretion of the police ‘to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity’”)
(quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997)).
16
See generally Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 202
(2018) (noting that the high rate of poor and minority pretrial detainees calls into question the effectiveness of the criminal bail scheme); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017) (arguing that because detained defendants are more likely to plead guilty than defendants who can afford bond, the bail system undermines
the fairness of the criminal legal system); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of
Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. ECON.
529, 529 (2017) (arguing that being detained directly “increases the probability of conviction”); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 511, 511 (2018) (studying the causal connection between pretrial detention and case
disposition); Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization
22 (Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 531, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2774453 [https://
perma.cc/G6WF-XTSK] (noting that “[m]any defendants who are detained on money bail before trial
choose to plead guilty in exchange for release”).
17
See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (offering a view of the court system that handles misdemeanor cases); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW
OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME] (analyzing the misdemeanor
system and its impact on people in the U.S.); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in ACADEMY FOR
JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 73 (Erik Luna ed., 2017)
(explaining the various problems with the misdemeanor system in the U.S.); Erica Hashimoto, The
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misdemeanor policy with its reports on policing and low-level case processing
in Ferguson and Baltimore. 18 Impact litigation groups have begun to find success litigating constitutional challenges to pretrial detention and fines-and-fees
regimes. 19 Increasing media coverage has brought the realities of troubled misdemeanor practice to a newly engaged public.
Yet despite the growing interest, there is little empirical data available
about the misdemeanor criminal justice system. 20 Criminal justice data are notoriously bad, but in the hierarchy of suboptimal data infrastructure, misdemeanor systems fall at the bottom. 21 Accordingly, empirical research on misdemeanors has focused on a few isolated jurisdictions. New York City makes
detailed misdemeanor data publicly available, which has allowed both government agencies and independent researchers to illuminate misdemeanor case

Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1019–21 (2013) (discussing the “profound problem” of underrepresentation for misdemeanor defendants); Eisha Jain,
Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015) (discussing the need to reform the misdemeanor system); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 645–53 (2014) [hereinafter Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice] (analyzing the effects
of prosecutorial discretion in misdemeanor case-handling); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and
Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation]
(suggesting that the goals of the criminal justice system have steered away from justice); Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 256–65 (2015) [hereinafter Natapoff,
Misdemeanors 2015] (cataloging recent scholarship on misdemeanors); Natapoff, Misdemeanors
2012, supra note 6, at 1313–14 (discussing the various problems with the misdemeanor system); Roberts, supra note 13, at 1099 (expressing the need “to have more defendants choose trial over a guilty
plea, or at least reject a quick, early guilty-plea”); Roberts, supra note 9 (offering a critique of legal
advocacy on behalf of misdemeanor defendants).
18
See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT 163 (2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.
cc/R5R3-KJ3T]; CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 102 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M5W-AMG2].
19
See, e.g., Criminalization of Poverty, S. CENTER FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.schr.org/ourwork/criminilization-of-poverty [https://perma.cc/K77A-3EK4]; Ending American Money Bail,
EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1/ [https://perma.cc/4ZX557ZC] (describing Equal Justice Under Law’s litigation campaign challenging various courts’ bail or
bond systems); Our Work, CIV. RTS. CORPS, https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work [https://perma.cc/
XB8B-8624].
20
See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 265 (diagnosing “an enormous need—and
enormous opportunity—for empirical studies of the petty offense system”).
21
At the top end, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and a range of
other federal agencies maintain enviable data about federal case processing, including nationwide data
about felony case processing. See, e.g., Publications & Products: Felony Defendants in Large Urban
Counties, BUREAU JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=27
[https://perma.cc/2UBM-QGRN]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) keeps national data on
reported crime and estimated arrests, but does not categorize its data by felony or misdemeanor offenses. See 2015 Crimes in the United States, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/home [https://perma.cc/VH54-FQC7].
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processing there. 22 A handful of studies have analyzed particular facets of misdemeanor court records elsewhere. 23 The new non-profit Measures for Justice
is collecting court data nationwide and, as of this writing, has published nine
misdemeanor-specific statistics that apply to between one and six states each. 24
A new misdemeanor research network sponsored by the Misdemeanor Justice
Project is producing a series of statistical reports on misdemeanor arrests in
selected cities. 25 Exciting and important though they are, these efforts only
22
See generally, e.g., MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART I: NONFELONY CASES (2007); NYC DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, AN
ANALYSIS OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE SUMMONSES, QUALITY-OF-LIFE MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, AND FELONY CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY, 2010–2015 (2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/

pdf/Quality-of-Life-Report-2010-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6BT-SCE3]; Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 611; Data Collaborative for Justice, JOHN JAY COLL., http://misdemeanor
justice.org [https://perma.cc/2ENR-XFUX] (providing a series of reports developed on the basis of New
York City misdemeanor data).
23
See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND
WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14–19 (2011), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/eb3f
8d52-d844-487c-bbf2-5090f5ca4be3/three-minute-justice-haste-and-waste-in-florida-s-misdemeanorcourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ3A-D6RA] (researching various aspects of misdemeanor cases in Florida);
GERALD R. WHEELER ET AL., PROJECT ORANGE JUMPSUIT: THE MISDEMEANOR REPORT #1, at 1–9
(2016), http://themisresearch.org/files/MISD_2016_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2X8-5ZV4] (reporting on pretrial and case outcomes in Harris County, Texas); Heaton et al., supra note 16 (reporting a
quantitative study of misdemeanor bail and pretrial detention in Harris County, Texas); Stevenson, supra
note 16 (including an analysis of misdemeanor bail data in Philadelphia).
24
See MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresforjustice.org [https://perma.cc/9DJJ-WSUA]
(last updated Mar. 13, 2020). The statistics (“measures”) are (1) percent of cases filed that are misdemeanor cases (in PA, 2009–2013), (2) percent of nonviolent misdemeanors initiated by citation (in
FL, 2009–2013), (3) percent of cases with nonmonetary pretrial release that involved only nonviolent
misdemeanor charges and defendants with no in-state conviction in the past three years (in PA and
WI, 2012–2013), (4) percent of cases with monetary bail that involved only nonviolent misdemeanor
charges and defendants with no in-state conviction in the past three years (in PA and WI, 2012–2013),
(5) percentage of nonviolent misdemeanor cases that were diverted in which the defendant had no instate conviction in the past three years (in PA and WI, 2012–2013), (6) percent of misdemeanor cases
resolved within ninety days (in AZ, FL, NC, PA, UT, and WI, 2009–2013), (7) median time to disposition for misdemeanors (in AZ, FL, NC, PA, UT, and WI, 2009–2013), (8) percent of nonviolent
misdemeanor convictions with defendants who had no in-state conviction in the past three years where
sentence is jail (in FL, PA, and WI, 2012–2013), and (9) median jail sentence length for nonviolent
misdemeanor convictions where defendant had no in-state conviction in the past three years (in FL,
PA, and WI, 2012–2013).
25
See generally JACQUELINE B. HELFGOTT ET AL., SEATTLE UNIV., TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR
ARRESTS, REFERRALS, & CHARGES IN SEATTLE (2018), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Trends_in_Misdemeanors_Seattle.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW2H-CPAD];
MEGHAN KOZLOWSKI-SERRA ET AL., UNIV. MD., TRACKING ENFORCEMENT RATES IN PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, MD 2006–2018: A REPORT OF THE RESEARCH NETWORK ON MISDEMEANOR
JUSTICE (2019), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RNMJ-PrinceGeorges-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4FQ-3LBA]; MEREDITH PATTEN ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW YORK, 1980 TO 2017 (2018), http://
misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK48-57W4];
BRIAN P. SCHAEFER ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRACKING ENFORCEMENT
RATES IN LOUISVILLE, 2009–2016 (2018), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
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represent a start. Considering that misdemeanor cases constitute the bulk of the
criminal justice system, we still know very little about how misdemeanor systems around the country actually operate. 26
In recent work, we undertook to synthesize the best available national data on misdemeanor arrests and case-filing rates in order to estimate the total
scale of the system as well as to chart high-level trends. 27 We found that, contrary to common perceptions, the misdemeanor system is shrinking. This does
not mean that the problems related to misdemeanor case volume are any less
serious than they appear, but rather that they are not new. 28 We found marked
racial disparities in misdemeanor arrest rates, although the degree of disparity
varied considerably by offense. 29 Several trends were strikingly consistent
across the data. The ranking of offense types by degree of racial disparity has
remained largely constant for the last thirty-seven years, and the arrest rate has
been dropping for decades for almost every offense category and in almost
every state for which data were available. 30 These patterns suggest some degree of uniformity in the structure of misdemeanor systems.
Having sketched the big-picture outlines of misdemeanor justice, our goal
in this Article is to zoom-in on the details. We aim to paint a basic empirical
portrait of misdemeanor case processing across a range of diverse jurisdictions.
2018/04/Tracking-Enforcement-Rates-in-Lousville-2009-to-2016_Misdemeanor-Justice...1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4G6M-QE3K]; LEE ANN SLOCUM ET AL., UNIV. MISS., TRACKING ENFORCEMENT RATES
IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, 2002–2017 (2018), http://misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/Tracking-Enforcement-Rates-in-St.-Louis_2002_2017.pdf?mod=article_inline [https://perma.
cc/Q5ZW-ACWP]; LORRAINE C. TAYLOR ET AL., N.C. CENT. UNIV., MISDEMEANOR ARREST
TRENDS IN THE CITY OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 2007–2016 (2019), https://datacollaborativefor
justice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Durham-Misdemeanor-Trends-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VJC9-GVRC].
26
Since we began work on this project, Alexandra Natapoff released her masterly book on misdemeanors, a book that includes an estimate of the total number of misdemeanor cases filed in 2015.
The John Jay Research Network on Misdemeanor Justice has facilitated the six reports on misdemeanor arrests, and the Prison Policy Institute of California has released a report documenting arrest
trends in California from 1980 to 2016, including for misdemeanors. See NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT
WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 17, at 2 (reporting that 80% of the criminal proceedings in the United
States are for misdemeanors); MAGNUS LOFSTROM ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., NEW INSIGHTS INTO CALIFORNIA ARRESTS: TRENDS, DISPARITIES, AND COUNTY DIFFERENCES 3–4 (2018),
https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/new-insights-into-california-arrests-trends-disparities-andcounty-differences.pdf [https://perma.cc/93SX-7BJQ]; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27
See generally Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 14 (providing a national study of misdemeanor
arrests and cases filed in the United States).
28
See id. at 764–69 (discussing this point).
29
Id. at 769–71. This phrasing is a simplification; rather than “misdemeanor arrest rates,” we
reported arrest rates for “likely-misdemeanor” offense categories because there are no national arrest
data available for misdemeanors specifically. Id. at 743–44. In order to obtain a rough approximation,
we extrapolated from FBI arrest data for offense categories that we judged likely to contain mostly
misdemeanors. Id. at 742–44.
30
Id. at 771.
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We have chosen eight, for reasons both practical and analytical: Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia); Cook County, Illinois (Chicago); Harris
County, Texas (Houston); Bexar County, Texas (San Antonio); Jefferson County, Kentucky (Louisville); rural Kentucky (a combined group of all Kentucky
counties with a population density below 250 people per square mile); 31 Fairfax County, Virginia (Fairfax); and rural Virginia (a combined group of all Virginia counties with a population density below 250 people per square mile). 32
For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the single counties by the name of
the major city each contains. Using detailed data drawn from court records, we
present both overview statistics for each jurisdiction and a more focused analysis of pretrial bond practice and sentencing. Because each jurisdiction has different institutional arrangements for classifying and adjudicating misdemeanors, the study focuses on cases handled in each jurisdiction’s “main” misdemeanor courts.
Our data confirm prior claims about the scale of the misdemeanor system
as well as the disproportionate burdens on poor people and people of color. We
estimate that 40.4 misdemeanor cases are filed annually per 1,000 people; if
our jurisdictions are representative of nationwide practice this would imply
that more than 13 million misdemeanor cases are filed each year in the United
States. 33 The weight of this gargantuan apparatus falls heavily on the poor and
on people of color. During the years we studied, every jurisdiction used money
bail as a determinant of pretrial release for at least some defendants. Frequently, the imposition of money bail resulted in pretrial detention, even at the lowest amounts. In the median jurisdiction for which this data was available, 43%
of defendants with bail set at $500 were detained pretrial. All jurisdictions imposed court costs upon conviction. Racial disparities, meanwhile, were pervasive. In every jurisdiction we studied, black people were overrepresented
among those charged with misdemeanors relative to population demographics,
and white people were underrepresented. Racial disparities in case-filing rates
were starkest in the Chicago area, where the case-filing rate for public-order
31
We calculated population density on the basis of each county’s land area as reported by the
U.S. Census Bureau in 2010, and its population as reported by the Census Bureau for 2013. Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density: 2010—United States—County by State; and for Puerto Rico,
AM. FACTFINDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/C3ZF-8Q8Y]; Population Estimates by Age, Sex,
Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-kits/
2018/estimates-characteristics.html# [https://perma.cc/F72H-T4JP]. “Rural Kentucky” includes 110
counties.
32
See supra note 31. “Rural Virginia” includes eighty-five counties.
33
This aligns with our prior national estimate. See Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 14, at 737,
745. It also accords with scholar Alexandra Natapoff’s recent estimate. See NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT
WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 17, at 251 (estimating the “total size of the 2015 US misdemeanor docket” at 13,240,034 criminal filings).
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and drug offenses was more than eleven times greater for black people than for
white.
The data illuminate other points of cross-jurisdictional commonality as
well. Nearly all convictions in almost every locale were resolved by guilty
plea; trials were vanishingly rare. 34 Four offense types—driving under the influence (DUI), simple assault, petty theft, and possession of marijuana—
constituted the majority of cases in most jurisdictions. 35 Public-order offenses
also constituted a meaningful proportion of cases. Consistent with the national
data, in all jurisdictions the total case-filing rate declined significantly during
the period of our analysis.
Yet the variation across jurisdictions was even more profound. Jurisdictions differ in the very behaviors they classify as misdemeanors as well as in
their institutional structures for adjudicating the many different kinds of cases
that constitute the sub-felony world (including misdemeanors, ordinance violations, traffic infractions, and civil offenses). Misdemeanor case-filing rates
ranged by a factor of three across our research sites. There was considerable
heterogeneity in practices at every stage of the proceedings. One notable heterogeneity is the variation in how different jurisdictions treat non-DUI traffic
offenses. This variation pertains both to the extent to which traffic offenses are
classified as misdemeanor offenses, and to whether they were processed in the
central misdemeanor court or in a special traffic court. To ensure at least some
level of comparability across jurisdictions, we drop traffic offenses from most
of our analyses. Finally, although the presence of racial disparity in case-filing
rates was universal, the degree of disparity varied widely. What the data reveal,
in other words, are misdemeanor court systems that may be broadly shaped in
common by exogenous forces, but that differ dramatically in the specifics of
their implementation.
This heterogeneity suggests some degree of dissensus, or at least the lack
of a consensus, about what behaviors warrant treatment as criminal misdemeanors, and what such treatment should entail. We cannot say how the heterogeneity in this data compares to felony case processing, but we suspect it is
more extreme. Regardless, the variation suggests that misdemeanor adjudication systems may have fundamentally different characters, and serve different
functions, from place to place. It thus presents a major challenge to efforts to
describe and theorize the contemporary landscape of misdemeanor justice.
A central theme of recent misdemeanor scholarship, for instance, is the
argument that contemporary misdemeanor enforcement practices serve less to
adjudicate guilt and punishment for specific bad acts than to regulate aggregate
34
35

Philadelphia is the exception. See infra Appendix A.
They are not the majority in Virginia, but still constitute more than 40% of cases.
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populations—in particular, people of color, the indigent, and those perceived to
have a propensity for disorderly or criminal behavior.36 This regulatory project
is facilitated, scholars suggest, by trivial and amorphous public-order offenses
that allow police and prosecutors vast discretion to selectively enforce the
law. 37 The objective of the criminal process, on this view, is not to sort the innocent from the guilty and ensure just punishment for each violation (what Issa
Kohler-Hausmann terms the “adjudicative model”). 38 Instead, the objective is
social control: “to sort and regulate people over time” through repeated contacts with the system and records that document those contacts (the “managerial model”). 39
Some of the patterns we document align with the managerial model. The
high case volume and almost complete absence of trials suggest a preference
for efficient disposition over accurate determinations of guilt. The racial disparities in case-filing rates and heavy reliance on monetary bail and penalties
are consistent with the thesis that misdemeanor justice disproportionately targets people of color and the poor. 40 The low conviction rates in most places
conform to a model that prizes documented contact with the system over punishment for specific acts, as do the high rates of diversion and deferred adjudication.
Other patterns offer more qualified support for the regulatory perspective.
Three of the four most commonly prosecuted offenses in every jurisdiction—
36
See, e.g., Jain, supra note 17, at 815 (arguing that arrests function “as a regulatory tool—a
means of monitoring, ordering, and tracking individuals,” a function at odds with “criminal law concerns” like “adjudicating guilt or innocence, maintaining law and order, deterring crime, and meting
out punishment”); Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 628 (arguing that the
New York City misdemeanor system operates by a managerial logic in which “the rules of criminal
procedure and criminal law are used as tools for socially regulating certain populations over time, as
opposed to punishing individual instances of lawbreaking”); Natapoff, Aggregation, supra note 17, at
1043 (arguing that “the misdemeanor system as it currently stands does not function as a traditional
‘criminal’ system of judgment in large part because aggregation erodes the substantive content of
criminal convictions”).
37
See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 645–46 (suggesting that the
“managerial model” of the criminal justice system and wide prosecutorial discretion explains why
noncriminal violations and infractions are the “largest conviction category resulting from misdemeanor arrests”); Sarah Pitcher McDonough, Colorblindness, Discretion, and Systemic Inequities in Criminal Justice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 742 (2015) (discussing law enforcement’s “zero-tolerance
regime[s]” that result in disproportionate arrests for low-level offenses).
38
Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 619–29.
39
Id.
40
Although we do not know the true incidence of most types of misdemeanor-classified behavior,
we do know that rates of drug use are fairly similar across races, but that drug arrests and case-filing
rates are not. See Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 257, 266–71 (2009) (noting that despite similar levels of drug use among white and
black individuals in the United States, policing is more often done in black and low-income neighborhoods).
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theft, simple assault, and DUI—do not seem like the kind of amorphous public-order offenses that permit boundless enforcement discretion. On the other
hand, possession of marijuana—which does appear conducive to selective
prosecution 41—was the fourth major offense category, and public-order offenses did constitute a meaningful portion of caseloads in many jurisdictions.
And even theft and assault enforcement may involve more discretion than an
outsider might assume. 42 Overall, though, the data suggest that there is a range
of phyla in the misdemeanor kingdom, and the extent to which enforcement
abandons the adjudicative model for a regulatory one may vary by offense
type.
The regulatory model does not, however, explain or account for the crossjurisdictional heterogeneity documented here. Nor does it explain why misdemeanor case-filing rates are on the decline, both nationally and in the eight
jurisdictions we studied. And some key features of the managerial model, including dramatic expansion in misdemeanor policing and prosecution, seem to
be the exception rather than the rule. 43 In sum, the present study offers some
support for the regulatory theme in misdemeanor scholarship, but also demonstrates its limits.
At the most fundamental level, the dramatic variation in misdemeanor
categorization and case processing in the jurisdictions we study calls into question the coherence of the very concept of a misdemeanor, or of misdemeanor
criminal justice. The legal category “misdemeanor” is itself amorphous. The
offenses it includes are a function of each jurisdiction’s idiosyncratic labelling
choices, and its boundaries overlap with other sub-felony categories (ordinance
violations, traffic infractions, and civil offenses). This is to say that the many
bodies of law that regulate individual conduct below the level of felony crime
form a tangled jungle. To analyze misdemeanor state court data alone, as we
have done, is like mapping a square foot of the Amazon. As exploration proceeds, a careful set of offense definitions tied to the regulated conduct or the
practical nature of enforcement rather than to contingent legal classifications
might help to map the contours of this wilderness. In the meantime, courts,
policymakers, and scholars should take care not to generalize about “misde-

41
See ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 9 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-rel2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6PV-PBDC] (noting that “state and
local governments have aggressively enforced marijuana laws selectively against Black people and
communities”).
42
See infra notes 167–188 and accompanying text (discussing the possible explanations for racial
disparities in the number of theft and assault cases).
43
See Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 643–47 (discussing the uptick in
arrests and charges for misdemeanors).
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meanors” on the false assumption that the term describes a coherent set of universally criminalized behaviors.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the eight jurisdictions
in the study and misdemeanor law and practice in each. 44 Part II presents the
empirical results. 45 Part III highlights the central takeaways from the empirical
analysis. 46 Part IV explores the implications of the analysis for our understanding of misdemeanor offenses and the misdemeanor system. 47
Although we believe that the cross-jurisdictional analysis is illuminating,
it is important to caution, at the outset, against drawing simple comparisons
across these jurisdictions. The degree of local variation in both misdemeanor
law and practice is extreme. Differences in demographics and local practice
influence misdemeanor process and outcomes in ways for which we cannot
control. The suboptimal state of criminal justice data infrastructure complicates
things further. Nonetheless, we hope to offer a platform for others to work
from, and to open the empirical window on the workings of misdemeanor justice a bit farther.
I. EIGHT MISDEMEANOR SYSTEMS
A. The Eight Jurisdictions
The eight jurisdictions used in this analysis were chosen largely because
we had access to detailed, individual-level court records from each. Fortuitously, though, they are diverse in terms of geography, population, and racial demographics. They include the densely populated urban districts of Philadelphia, Chicago, and Houston; San Antonio, a medium-sized city with a large Hispanic population; the small cities of Louisville and Fairfax; and the predominantly white rural counties of Kentucky and Virginia. The populations and racial composition of the jurisdictions are shown below in Table 1. 48

44

See infra notes 48–91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 92–139 and accompanying text.
46
See infra notes 140–164 and accompanying text.
47
See infra notes 165–199 and accompanying text.
48
Because the most recent year for which complete data were available in every jurisdiction during our research was 2013, several of our analyses focus on that year. Population Estimates by Age,
Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/presskits/2018/estimates-characteristics.html# [https://perma.cc/F72H-T4JP]. In some cases, the sum of the
white, black, and Hispanic populations is greater than the total. This is likely because the category
“Hispanic” is not exclusive of “white” or “black”; some people will have self-identified as two of the
three.
45
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Table 1: Jurisdiction Demographics
Jurisdiction

Data Years

Major City

Pop.

White

Black

Hisp.

Bexar County, TX

2011-2016

San Antonio

1.8M

85%

8%

59%

Harris County, TX

2011-2013

Houston

4.3M

71%

20%

42%

Philadelphia County, PA

2011-2015

Philadelphia

1.5M

45%

45%

13%

Cook County, IL

2011-2013

Chicago

5.2M

66%

25%

25%

Jefferson County, KY

2011-2016

Louisville

0.7M

74%

21%

5%

Rural KY

2011-2016

N/A

2.6M

93%

5%

3%

Fairfax County, VA

2011-2016

Fairfax

1.1M

67%

10%

16%

Rural VA

2011-2016

N/A

2.5M

83%

14%

3%

Note: The race percentages do not sum to one because both white and black defendants may also identify as
Hispanic.

In addition to analyzing the court records, we also interviewed defenders,
prosecutors, judges, clerks, and other knowledgeable criminal justice practitioners in each jurisdiction. These interviews provided information about local
misdemeanor practices that helps to illuminate the empirical results.
B. Common Elements in Misdemeanor Law and Practice
To some extent, it is possible to describe misdemeanor criminal justice
across these eight jurisdictions in common terms. To start, a body of federal
constitutional law provides common legal scaffolding. Most core constitutional
protections for criminal defendants apply to felony and misdemeanor proceedings alike, including the prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures, 49
coerced self-incrimination, 50 and excessive bail; 51 the right to confrontation
and cross-examination; 52 and the due-process requirement that the state prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 53 In other arenas, the
Supreme Court has developed misdemeanor-specific jurisprudence. It has declined to interpret the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting warrantless arrest for
minor, non-violent crimes—although states may certainly do so. 54 Warrantless
49

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id. amend. V.
51
Id. amend. VIII.
52
Id. amend. VI.
53
Id. amend. V; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that “the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
54
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit arrest for a seat-belt violation). An arrest based on probable cause will not vio50
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home entry to effect a misdemeanor arrest “should be rare,” but the Court has
stopped short of holding that it will always be unconstitutional. 55 Once
charged, a person accused of a misdemeanor has the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial only if the offense is punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment or if the authorized penalties, in combination, are “so severe as to indicate that the legislature considered the offense serious.” 56 The jury must be
constituted of at least six jurors. 57 There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel unless the adjudication results in an actual sentence of imprisonment (including a suspended sentence). 58 An uncounseled conviction may later be used
for purposes of sentencing enhancement in future criminal proceedings so long
as the uncounseled conviction required the state to prove the underlying charge
beyond a reasonable doubt. 59
The substantive statutory law defining misdemeanor offenses also has
common features across our eight jurisdictions. 60 Each defines the category
“misdemeanor” in terms of the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized, which is one year everywhere except Pennsylvania. 61 Each state’s penal
code contains several hundred offenses explicitly designated as misdemeanors,
and others identifiable as misdemeanors because of the authorized sentence. 62
Beyond the penal code, there are many hundreds of additional misdemeanor
offenses scattered throughout each jurisdiction’s statutes, including heavy concentrations of traffic and regulatory offenses. In addition, each state authorizes
late the Fourth Amendment even if it violates state law. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177–78
(2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when police officers arrested an individual for driving with a suspended license even though the officers should have issued a summons under
state law).
55
Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 7 (2013) (holding that a police officer who made such entry was
entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action because the law governing constitutionality of such
entries was not “clearly established”).
56
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996). The fact that multiple charges may result in
an aggregate sentence of more than six months does not trigger the jury trial right. Id. at 322–23.
57
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244–45 (1978) (holding that a jury of fewer than six jurors
deprives the defendant of the right to trial by jury).
58
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657, 674 (2002); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373–74 (1979) (limiting the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to criminal defendants facing imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (stating that in misdemeanor cases
“that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of ‘the
guiding hand of counsel’”).
59
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994).
60
The remainder of the discussion in this section and in Part I.C synthesizes legal information
and information derived from telephone interviews with local practitioners that is documented in
greater detail in Appendix A.
61
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090 (West
2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(b)(6), 1101(4) (West 2019); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.21 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (2019).
62
See infra Table 2.
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its municipalities to define criminal municipal offenses (by ordinance) that are
punishable as misdemeanors (they may either be classified as “misdemeanors”
or classified in other terms but subject to equivalent punishment). 63 Many do,
and municipal offenses tend to overlap significantly with state statutory misdemeanors.
Misdemeanor case processing in each jurisdiction is characterized by informality, volume, and haste. Interviewees from several jurisdictions report
that pretrial detention has an outsized effect on case outcomes, because those
detained will often plead guilty for time served in order to obtain release,
whereas those not in custody are more willing to draw out a case. 64 Recent
empirical work supports that proposition. 65 Dismissal rates for non-detention
cases are reportedly high, particularly as more time elapses, because witnesses
regularly fail to appear. 66
A misdemeanor case begins with either an arrest, a citation, or a summons. 67 Those arrested will either be released, or they will be detained until the
case is resolved. The most common mechanisms of pretrial release in our jurisdictions were release on recognizance (ROR), where a person simply promises to return to court; release on an unsecured money bond; or release on a
secured cash bond that requires up-front payment (cash bail). Bail hearings are
generally held within forty-eight hours of arrest. 68 A judicial officer makes a
determination of probable cause, explains to each defendant the charge(s)
against him, and sets a bond or conditions of release. None of our jurisdictions

63
See infra Appendix A. In Pennsylvania, municipalities appear limited to defining “summary
offenses” by ordinance, but summary offenses can be punished by comparable fines and sometimes
jail. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(c), 1101.
64
Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, Chief Pub. Def., Pub. Def.’s Office, Harris Cty., Tex.
(Aug. 28, 2017); Telephone Interview with Michael Morrissey, Deputy, Cook Cty. Pub. Def. (Oct. 11,
2017).
65
Heaton et al., supra note 16, at 741–58 (using a natural experiment as well as regression techniques to evaluate the effect of misdemeanor pretrial detention on case outcomes in Harris County,
finding that detention significantly increases the likelihood of conviction, and meaningfully increases
the likelihood that a person will be rearrested within 180 days).
66
See Dobbie et al., supra note 16, at 203 (noting that defendants who are released from jail pretrial have a lesser likelihood of being convicted). We unfortunately cannot distinguish true dismissals
from other dispositions (like diversion or deferred adjudication resulting in an eventual dismissal) in
our data. See infra Part II.A.6.
67
See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 334 (2016) (noting the different
ways in which criminal cases can begin). There is no uniform definition of an arrest, citation, or summons, though an arrest generally entails custodial transportation and jail booking. See id. at 310–11
(offering a “functional definition of arrests”).
68
See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–58 (1991) (holding that courts that
“combine probable cause determinations with other pretrial proceedings” must make a determination
of probable cause within forty-eight hours after the arrest).
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provided defense counsel at bail hearings during the period our data covers
(2011 through 2016).
In most jurisdictions, the arrest/summons/citation charge only constitutes
the preliminary charge; the prosecuting agency must then decide what formal
charges, if any, to file. This prosecutorial determination is among the least
transparent features of misdemeanor systems. 69 The rate at which prosecutors
declined arrest charges, sometimes called the “declination rate,” was not visible in our data. Houston is unique in that the police check with the prosecutor’s
office over the phone before booking a defendant; thus, the declination rate
there is likely to be low. 70 None of the people we interviewed knew the misdemeanor declination rate in their jurisdiction. 71
Arraignment, a defendant’s initial appearance in the court of jurisdiction,
typically happens within a day or two of the bail hearing for defendants in custody and within a month for others. Interviewees in several jurisdictions reported that many cases resolve at this appearance. 72 Defendants in custody
may plead guilty for time served. Others may be eligible for diversion.
Arraignment typically marks the point at which the court appoints defense
counsel for the indigent. All eight jurisdictions claim to provide representation
for indigent defendants at risk of a carceral sentence, although the mechanisms
for providing representation differ, and the numbers alone say little about the
quality of representation. Public defenders whom we interviewed described
staggering caseloads. None of the jurisdictions provide counsel for offenses
not punishable by time in jail.
Nearly all misdemeanor cases in the eight jurisdictions are ultimately dismissed by prosecutors or resolved by guilty plea. 73 Some percentage of cases are
dismissed outright. Diversion and deferred adjudication are prevalent across jurisdictions, and end either in dismissal—if a defendant complies with all conditions—or in a guilty plea or trial, if she does not. A defendant who is convicted is
sentenced to jail time, probation, fines and fees, or some combination.
A last common element in misdemeanor practice across our jurisdictions
is reform. In recent years there have been two primary areas of change: bail
69
See Alexandra Natapoff, A Stop Is Just a Stop: Terry’s Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
113, 125 (2017) (explaining that the “line between being arrested and being charged . . . is not always
so clear on the ground”).
70
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before Arrest, 2019 U.
ILL. L. REV. 833, 860–65 (discussing the prosecutorial system in Harris County, Texas).
71
Institutional charging practices varied among our jurisdictions. For more information, see infra
Appendix A.
72
Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, Counsel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
(Aug. 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64.
73
This is both reported by interviewees and confirmed by the data. The exception is Philadelphia,
where many misdemeanor cases are tried in bench trials. See infra Part II.C & Appendix A.
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practice and the prosecution of marijuana possession. All eight jurisdictions
have pretrial reform efforts underway, efforts centered on limiting the use of
money bail, implementing actuarial risk assessment, and reducing rates of pretrial detention. 74 Many have also curbed arrests and prosecution for first-time
74
There is not enough room to catalog all of these efforts here, but briefly: Kentucky and Virginia have each been leaders in pretrial reform and in the use of pretrial risk assessment. See generally,
e.g., MARIE VANNOSTRAND, VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ASSESSING RISK AMONG
PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS IN VIRGINIA: THE VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 6
(2003), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/assessingrisk-among-pretrial-defendants-virginia-virginia-pretrial-risk-assessment-instrument.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X989-FABT] (discussing the results of a pretrial risk assessment program in Virginia); MARIE
VANNOSTRAND & KENNETH J. ROSE, LUMINOSITY INC., PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA
1–2 (2009), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/virginiapretrial-risk-assessment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W686-ZPTR] (discussing the duties and responsibilities of Virginia’s pretrial services agencies); Robert Veldman, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky:
An Analysis of the Impact of House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its Implementation, 102
KY. L.J. 777, 783–84 (2013) (discussing the various criminal law reforms passed in Kentucky). Kentucky passed state legislation restructuring its pretrial system in 2011. See Veldman, supra, at 783–84
(discussing the various changes to Kentucky’s pretrial system). In Houston (Harris County), the impact-litigation group Civil Rights Corps filed a federal class-action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the misdemeanor bail schedule in 2016. The lawsuit ended in a settlement and dramatic
restructuring of Harris County’s misdemeanor bail system in 2019. See, e.g., Gabrielle Banks, Federal
Judge Gives Final Approval to Harris County Bail Deal, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Federal-judge-approves-Harris
-County-bail-deal-14853781.php [https://perma.cc/FX86-EU6D] (describing the “historic bail reform
agreement” that “set[s] in place new protections for people accused of minor offenses in the country’s
third largest criminal justice system”). Harris County has also piloted new programs providing defense
representation at bail hearings and implementing a pretrial risk assessment tool. Mihir Zaveri, Harris
County to Place Public Defenders at Bail Hearings, HOUS. C HRON. (Mar. 14, 2017), https://
www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-to-place-publicdefenders-at-bail-11002089.php [https://perma.cc/2Y6G-8BYU]. Philadelphia has been awarded a
MacArthur Grant to pursue initiatives to improve pretrial practice and reduce its pretrial jail populations, several of which are underway. Press Release, Phila. Dep’t of Prisons, Office of Criminal Justice, Office of the Mayor, City Awarded $4 Million by MacArthur Safety and Justice Challenge (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.phila.gov/2018-10-24-city-awarded-4-million-by-macarthur-safety-andjustice-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/ZBF4-3KFR]. The election of District Attorney Larry Krasner in
2018 further altered Philadelphia bail practice. E.g., Samantha Melamed, Philly DA Larry Krasner
Stopped Seeking Bail for Low-Level Crimes. Here’s What Happened Next., PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb.
19, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philly-district-attorney-larry-krasner-money-bail-criminaljustice-reform-incarceration-20190219.html [https://perma.cc/P9Z7-RA33]. And in Chicago, the
Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court issued a new court rule in July 2017 designed to “ensure no defendant is held in custody prior to trial solely because the defendant cannot afford to post
bail.” General Order No. 18.8A—Procedures for Bail Hearings and Pretrial Release, CIR. CT. OF
COOK COUNTY, ILL. (July 17, 2017), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/
ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/2562/GENERAL-ORDER-NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-BailHearings-and-Pretrial-Release.aspx [https://perma.cc/H7RJ-Y96X]. Civil Rights Corps, in partnership
with the MacArthur Justice Center, has also filed a class-action suit challenging money bail practices
in Cook County, and the Illinois Supreme Court made a new statewide rule change to restrict the use
of money bail and increase rates of pretrial release. Cook County, IL: Bail, CIV. RTS. CORPS,
http://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/case/cook-county-il-bail [https://perma.cc/5CFR-UNGH]; Illi-
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possession of marijuana. These changes mean that our data may not entirely reflect current practice. But they do provide context for the current reform efforts.
C. Variation in Misdemeanor Law and Practice
Notwithstanding the common elements of misdemeanor law and practice
across our eight jurisdictions, there is also significant variation. To begin with,
the very definition of a “misdemeanor” varies. Everywhere except Pennsylvania, misdemeanors are those offenses punishable by a maximum of one year’s
imprisonment, but in Pennsylvania they are punishable by up to five years
and/or a $10,000 fine. Misdemeanors in Pennsylvania consequently include
more serious offenses such as involuntary manslaughter and some drug distribution offenses. 75
A second point of variance is the relationship between state and municipal
law in each place. Each of the states in our study permits municipalities to enact their own criminal offenses, which tend to overlap with the state’s penal
code. Some of these municipal offenses are designated as “misdemeanors.”
Others are called “violations” or “summary offenses.” Sometimes they carry
potential jail sentences, and sometimes not. 76 To make matters more complicated, every jurisdiction has a different arrangement for channeling these various offense classes into court. In some places they are all handled together in
the same courts; other jurisdictions divide them into subclasses that are funneled into multiple local court systems. 77
There is also significant variation in how cases progress through court. 78
In Texas and Kentucky, defendants have a state-constitutional right to bail. 79 In
nois Supreme Court Issues Substantial Rule Changes Regarding State’s Bail and Bond System, ILL.
STATE BAR ASSOC. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.isba.org/barnews/2019/03/illinoissupremecourt
issuessubstanti [https://perma.cc/6ND5-SXK8] (reporting on rule changes enacted to align with recent
revisions of the bond system).
75
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (involuntary manslaughter); 35 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (West 2019) (inter alia, distribution of adulterated controlled substances).
76
Texas municipal codes, for instance, include criminal offenses that are designated as Class C
misdemeanors but do not carry jail sentences. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE chs. 3–6, 10–12, 15, 16, 21,
22, 31, 34–36 (2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06 (West 2019). The Philadelphia municipal code, by contrast, includes offenses that do carry jail sentences but that are not explicitly designated as misdemeanors. E.g., PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 10-100, § 10-115 (2020) (providing that “[i]n
addition to any fine, imprisonment for not more than 90 days may be imposed for a violation of § 10104.2 [prohibiting vicious animals on city playgrounds]”).
77
In Kentucky and Virginia, state misdemeanors and municipal offenses are handled together in
the “district courts.” In Texas, by contrast, jailable misdemeanors are handled in the “County Courts at
Law,” although non-jailable misdemeanors (both state and municipal) are handled in justice-of-thepeace (JP) and municipal courts. In Philadelphia and Chicago, state-law offenses and municipal offenses are handled in the same court but on separate dockets. See infra Appendix A.
78
For details and sources, see infra Appendix A.
79
KY. CONST. § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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the other states, courts can order a defendant detained pretrial under certain
conditions. Bail bondsmen are prevalent in Texas and Virginia, play a more
limited role in Philadelphia and Chicago due to those jurisdictions’ use of a
deposit system, and have been abolished in Kentucky. Philadelphia is an outlier in adjudication procedure; a much higher percentage of misdemeanor cases
go to trial than elsewhere due to a culture of expedited bench trials. Diversion
and deferred adjudications are common everywhere but work quite differently
from place to place.
Table 2 summarizes key legal and institutional features of misdemeanor
case processing across the eight jurisdictions we studied. The table synthesizes
information that is presented more fully, and with applicable source citations,
in Appendix A. The discussion will address relevant jurisdictional differences
in more depth as it proceeds.
Table 2: Legal and Institutional Features of Misdemeanor Adjudication 80
PA/
Philadelphia

IL/
Chicago

TX

VA

KY

State-Law Misdemeanors
Maximum carceral
sentence
Maximum fine
(for an individual)
Approx. number of
misdemeanors in penal
code
Traffic misdemeanors
in penal code
Approx. number of
misdemeanors in other
statutes
Approx. number of
state traffic misdemeanors
Classification scheme

5 yrs.

1 yr.

1 yr.

1 yr.

1 yr.

$10,000

$2,500

$4,000

$2,500

$500

212

206

162

290

145

None

None

DUIs

DUIs

DUIs

840

860

600

830

330

36

111

139

135

14

1st, 2nd, 3rd
degree,
summary
offenses

Classes A, B,
C, petty
offenses,
business
offenses

Classes
A, B, C

Classes 1, 2,
3, 4, traffic
infractions

Classes A, B,
violations

Municipal vs. State Law

Yes

Yes, if not
preempted
or contra
state
policy

Law says no,
but they do
(same
penalty)

Yes; penalties cannot
exceed state
penalty

Yes; penalty
must be
identical to
state
penalty

Yes (plus
summary
offenses,

Yes

Yes
(Class C)

Yes

Yes (plus
violations)

Municipality can enact
overlapping offenses?

Municipality
codes
include “misdemeanors”?
80

For additional details and sources, see infra Appendix A.
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PA/
Philadelphia
violations)

IL/
Chicago

TX

VA

KY

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes (but few)

Summary
offenses

Municipal
misdemeanors

State-law
misdemeanors
(Class C)

Non-criminal
infractions
(state or
muni)

Violations

District
Courts

District
Courts

Public
Defender/
Courtappointed
from list

Public
Defender

District
Courts

District
Courts

Commonwealth
Attorney (or
arresting
officer)

County
Attorney

District
Courts

District
Courts

Institutional Structure
Court(s) that handle(s)
state-law misdemeanors
at the trial level
Municipal
Court

Dailey
Center, 555
W. Harrison, branch
courtrooms,
Criminal
Court

Indigent defense

Public
Defender

Court(s) that handle(s)
municipal offenses

Municipal
Court (separate docket)

Public
Defender

Dailey
Center,
branch
courtrooms

Class A/B:
County
Courts at
Law;
Class C:
Justice-ofthe-Peace
& Municipal Courts
Class A/B:
Public
Defender
(limited),
appointed
counsel;
Class C:
none
Justice-ofthe-Peace
& Municipal Courts

Agency that prosecutes
District
Attorney
Where traffic offenses
are processed

City
Attorney

Post-2016:
Municipal
Dailey Center
Court Traffic
“minor
Division
traffic
rooms”
Pre-2017:
Traffic Court

District
Attorney
DUIs in
County
Courts;
most others
in Justiceof-thePeace &
Municipal
Courts

Summons vs. Arrest
Summons-eligible
misdemeanor offenses

Summons-mandatory
misdemeanor offenses

2nd/ 3rd degree misdemeanor, 1st
degree DUI
Same (under
certain conditions)

Any
misdemeanor

None

All Class C,
some A/B

None

Any
Any
misdemeanor misdemeanor
Class 3, 4
misdemeanor;
some Class
1, 2 under

Same (under
certain
conditions)
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VA

KY

certain
conditions
Pretrial Custody

No

For those not
facing
mandatory
carceral
sentence

Yes

Ambiguous

Yes

Yes, but rare
in
Philadelphia

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Harris
County:
No;
Bexar County: ?

Mostly No

Mostly Yes

Right-to-bail state?

Bail bondsmen
authorized?
Fixed bail schedules
authorized?
Defense representation
at bail hearings?

No

Idiosyncrasies

More serious
misdemeanors; waiver
track; bail
deposit
program;
separate
traffic court
(until 2016).

Most traffic
offenses,
Class C
misdemeanors
Traffic
and all
infractions
municipal
are
misdenon-criminal.
meanors in
justice-ofthe-peace &
municipal
courts.

No bail
bondsmen;
all state and
municipal
offenses
handled
together in
District
Courts.

D. The Datasets
Our data consist of detailed, individual-level court records from each of
the jurisdictions described above. We acquired the data for Philadelphia, Houston, and Kentucky in the course of other research projects. 81 Philadelphia and
Houston data were web-scraped from online public court records, 82 and the
81
Heaton et al., supra note 16 (quantitative study of misdemeanor bail and pretrial detention in
Harris County, Texas); Stevenson, supra note 16 (quantitative study of bail and pretrial detention in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). See generally Megan T. Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action,
103 MINN. L. REV. 303 (2018) (quantitative study of bail and pretrial detention in Kentucky after
implementation of a risk assessment tool).
82
For Philadelphia, Common Pleas Court docket sheets were web-scraped from the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania’s Web Portal. The dataset for this article contains all cases that originated
in municipal court where the most serious original charge is a misdemeanor between the years 2011–
2015. Common Pleas Courts Docket Sheets, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. WEB PORTAL [hereinafter PA
DOCKET SHEETS], https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx [https://perma.cc/NA4Q-7R8P].
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Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts provided the Kentucky data upon request. 83 Data for the San Antonio area as well as for all Virginia jurisdictions are publicly available online. 84 Civil Rights Corps and the Macarthur Justice Project shared the Chicago-area data, which they had previously acquired
from Cook County courts pursuant to an open records request. 85
Depending on the jurisdiction, the data contain hundreds of thousands to
more than a million court records describing misdemeanor cases. Each court
record, in turn, contains some combination of the following: individual demographic information (sex, age, race), charged offense(s), information relating to
bail and pretrial release, information relating to defense representation (i.e.
presence of counsel and counsel type—public defender, appointed private, or
private), adjudication information, and sentencing information. Because each
jurisdiction codifies hundreds of misdemeanor crimes, it was necessary to
group them into meaningful categories for the sake of the analysis. We coded
the offense descriptions at several levels of generality, 86 ultimately matching

For Houston, data was web-scraped from the website of the Harris County District Clerk. The dataset
contains all misdemeanor cases filed in the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law between the years
2011–2013. OFFICE OF HARRIS CTY. DIST. CLERK—MARILYN BURGESS [hereinafter HOUS. DOCKET
SHEETS], https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/eDocs/Public/NewUserAcknowledgement.aspx [https://
perma.cc/G6KW-UULW].
83
Statistical Reports, KY. COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter KY DOCKET SHEETS], https://courts.ky.
gov/aoc/statisticalreports/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/HWQ8-KU52]. The data include all
cases in which the most serious charge was a misdemeanor between the years 2011–2016.
84
VA. JUDICIAL SYS. [hereinafter VA DOCKET SHEETS], http://www.courts.state.va.us/ [https://
perma.cc/CH3M-XNFU]. A private individual has web-scraped and aggregated this data for public
use. VA. COURT DATA, http://virginiacourtdata.org/ [https://perma.cc/7GUW-XDHQ]. The dataset for
this article includes all misdemeanor cases filed in the Virginia circuit and district courts between the
years 2011–2016. The Bexar County data was downloaded from the website of the District Clerk, and
includes all misdemeanor cases filed in the Bexar County district courts between the years 2011–
2016. Reports & Records Searches, BEXAR CTY. COURTHOUSE, ONLINE SERVS. [hereinafter SAN
ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS], https://www.bexar.org/254/Reports-Record-Searches [https://perma.cc/
23D9-KNBR].
85
Civil Rights Corps obtained the data via a Freedom of Information Act request for all misdemeanor cases in Cook County between the years 2011–2013 [hereinafter CHI. DOCKET SHEETS]. As
noted below, the data received is missing several misdemeanor categories. Based on interviews and
data analysis, we presume that data received is from the main misdemeanor court. We have omitted
Chicago from the analysis when the data were not reliable enough to include.
86
We first coded each offense description at a fairly specific level (for example, all offenses that
appeared to be resisting-arrest charges were coded as “resisting arrest”; all offenses related to gambling were coded as “gambling”), and then at a more general level, by matching every offense to a
more general offense type: DUI, possession of marijuana, other controlled substance offenses, offenses relating to minors, property damage, public-order offenses, regulatory offenses (i.e. violations of
regulations governing commercial activity, fishing, hunting, gambling, etc.), prostitution, other sexrelated offenses, non-DUI traffic offenses, theft/fraud/burglary offenses, violent offenses, weapons
offenses, and miscellaneous offenses. These offense types were then grouped into the following seven
categories: drugs, DUI, public-order, theft, traffic, violent, and other.
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each offense to seven primary offense categories: drugs, DUI, public-order,
theft, traffic, violent, and other. 87
In each jurisdiction, our dataset contains the misdemeanor cases processed in what we might call the main misdemeanor courts: the state courts
that adjudicate most of the offenses designated as “misdemeanors.” Because of
the variation in local law and practice, though, the scope of the datasets differs.
The Kentucky and Virginia datasets include all state and municipal misdemeanors, including a significant volume of traffic cases. 88 In the other jurisdictions, the lower courts are more fragmented and the records of the “main misdemeanor courts” are more limited. 89 Table 3 depicts the offense types that
each dataset covers.

87
For Philadelphia, San Antonio, and Houston—datasets that contained only several hundred
offense descriptions each—we were able to do this coding comprehensively. Unfortunately, the other
jurisdictions had “open-form” text entry for inputting the offense data, resulting in wide discrepancies
in the shorthand used for describing an offense. For instance, reckless driving at 15-miles-per-hour
above the speed limit could be written “R/D-15 MPH OVER,” “RD 15,” “RECKLESS 15MPH,” as
well as any permutation of those terms. (Some jurisdictions also included a reference to the statute
number of the charged offense, but no jurisdiction had a uniform method for inputting statute numbers
either, so there was similar variation among listed statute references.) This resulted in tens of thousands of distinct offense descriptions. We began by coding a random sample of several thousand records and then matched the coded offenses from this random sample back to the complete dataset. In
addition, we used a computational method known as “regular expressions” to identify common abbreviations and wordings. (For example, we wrote code to search for all offense descriptions containing
the phrase “R/D” and categorized these as reckless driving.) Ultimately, we were able to categorize
92% of offenses in Virginia and more than 99% of offenses in the other jurisdictions. The files we
used to code offenses are on file with the authors and available for review or duplication. In addition,
Appendix B documents the last stage of our grouping process, enumerating the more specific offense
groups that we ultimately included in each of our final seven categories.
88
In Kentucky, state and municipal misdemeanors are handled together in the district courts. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.110, 83A.065 (West 2019). In Virginia, municipal misdemeanors are handled in the district courts, and state-law misdemeanors are handled in the circuit courts, but our data
includes both. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-123.1, 16.1-126, 17.1-513 (2019).
89
The Houston and San Antonio datasets, which derive from the County Courts at Law, include
all jail-eligible misdemeanors but generally exclude fine-only (“Class C”) misdemeanors, which are
processed in JP or municipal court, depending on the arresting agency. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 27.031, 29.003 (West 2019). A handful of Class C misdemeanors, however, do show up in our
data. Interviewees explained that Class C cases are occasionally adjudicated in the County Courts at
Law if the District Attorney (DA) downgrades a Class A or B arrest charge, or if the Class C charge
arises from the same incident as Class A or B charges and so is filed alongside them in the County
Court. The Philadelphia dataset includes all misdemeanors, but they are more serious than in other
places; they include few traffic and no fine-only offenses. The Chicago dataset includes all state-law
misdemeanors except for traffic offenses. This may be because traffic misdemeanors are coded as
“vehicle offenses” rather than “misdemeanor offenses” in the court’s database, although they are in
fact both. See Telephone Interview with Joe Magats, First Assistant, Cook Cty. State Attorney’s Office (Apr. 12, 2018). The Chicago dataset excludes municipal offenses.
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Table 3: Case-Types Included in Each Dataset

At first, the variation in the scope of the datasets seemed like a major limitation of the data because it is difficult to make cross-jurisdictional comparisons with no common baseline. Eventually, however, we began to view this not
as a limitation of the data, but rather as a fundamental feature of misdemeanor
justice in the United States, a theme that we take up in Part IV. In the end, an
empirical analysis focused on cases adjudicated in the main misdemeanor
courts seemed as sensible a level of analysis as any. We have, however, made
one modification to enhance consistency across jurisdictions: we have omitted
non-DUI traffic offenses from most of the analysis. 90 Their incidence is reported in Part II.A, and we hope to conduct a more in-depth analysis of misdemeanor traffic offenses in future research. Once non-DUI traffic offenses are
excluded, the remaining caseloads exhibit enough consistency across jurisdictions to make meaningful comparison possible. 91 Thus, the unit of analysis in
the bulk of this paper is non-traffic misdemeanor cases tried in the relevant
jurisdiction’s main misdemeanor courts.
Part II presents a cross-jurisdictional analysis of misdemeanor criminal
justice. It is tempting to draw inferences from the comparison, seeking a causal
story behind the differences and similarities shown. We encourage the reader—
and have endeavored ourselves—to resist this temptation. The jurisdictions in
this analysis vary so widely that it would be highly difficult to pinpoint reasons
for the differences. Think of this study instead like a butterfly collection: a

90
The rationale for this modification is that (1) in each dataset, non-DUI traffic misdemeanors are
the largest subcategory of misdemeanors, and (2) traffic offenses are often handled significantly differently from other misdemeanors (many are fine-only and originate with citation instead of arrest,
etc.).
91
See infra Part II.A.
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presentation of colorful examples within the loosely defined phylum of “misdemeanor criminal justice.” The goal is simply to see what is there.
II. A CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL STUDY OF MISDEMEANOR COURT RECORDS
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section A documents basic features of
case processing in each jurisdiction: defendant demographics, case-filing rates,
the frequency of cases with multiple charges, defense representation rates, conviction rates, case duration, and racial disparities in case-filing and conviction
rates. 92 Section B presents information about pretrial release and detention.93
Section C synthesizes sentencing data across our eight jurisdictions. 94
A. Overview Metrics
1. Defendant Demographics
We know that many people find themselves in misdemeanor court—but
who are they? In our data, the age and gender composition of defendants
across jurisdictions was fairly consistent. In all jurisdictions the average defendant age was between thirty-one and thirty-five, and between 67% and 77%
of defendants were male. 95 Racial composition was more varied, reflecting in
part the racial composition of the regions. Rural Kentucky had the highest percentage of white defendants (88%) and the lowest percentage of black defendants (10%); 96 the converse was true of Chicago (22% of defendants were white
and 61% were black). 97 Hispanic people represented 40% of San Antonio misdemeanor defendants but only a small fraction of defendants in Virginia. 98 The
data do not reliably document the percentage of Hispanic defendants in other
jurisdictions. We note, too, that race data were missing in a significant minority
of cases in Philadelphia and the Chicago area.
It is well known that the U.S. criminal justice system has a disproportionate impact on people of color, 99 and the misdemeanor systems in this study are
no exception. Relative to the demographics of the general population, black
people were overrepresented in the misdemeanor defendant population in eve92

See infra notes 95–126 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 127–135 and accompanying text.
94
See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
95
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions
studied).
96
KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83.
97
CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85.
98
SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84; VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
99
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (chronicling the many ways in which the U.S. criminal justice system discriminates against people of color).
93
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ry single jurisdiction. The most dramatic discrepancy was in the Chicago area,
where black people comprised 22% of the general population but 61% of misdemeanor defendants. The discrepancy was smallest in Philadelphia. 100 Table 4
includes the racial demographics of the defendants in our dataset as well as the
black/white proportions of each jurisdiction’s general population. Figure 1 illustrates the discrepancies in racial demographics.

Rural KY

Louisville

Rural VA

N/A

31

31

35

N/A

N/A

34

35

Black

61%

39%

13%

47%

25%

20%

39%

9%

(in Gen. Pop.)

22%

20%

8%

45%

10%

14%

21%

5%

White

22%

58%

44%

37%

65%

76%

60%

87%

(in Gen. Pop.)

66%

71%

85%

45%

67%

83%

74%

93%

Hispanic

N/A

N/A

41%

N/A

2%

2%

N/A

N/A

Other/Unknown

14%

3%

2%

13%

8%

2%

1%

4%

Male

N/A

77%

72%

77%

78%

72%

70%

65%

Houston

Age

Chicago

Fairfax

Philadelphia

San Antonio

Table 4: Defendant Demographics

100
Notably, Chicago (Cook County) is much larger than Philadelphia County in terms of both
population (5.2 versus 1.5 million, respectively) and land area (233.2 versus 142.71 square miles,
respectively). Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density: 2010 - United States—Congressional
District by State; and for Puerto Rico, Am. FactFinder, U.S. Census Bureau, https://factfinder.census.
gov/faces/tableser ices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_SF1_GCTPH1.US04PR&prod
Type=table [https://perma.cc/E3X6-DX3V]; supra Table 1.
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Figure 1: Racial Representation in Misdemeanor Court

Note: This graph compares the percentage of residents in each jurisdiction that are
white/black against the percentage of misdemeanor cases in each jurisdiction that are filed
against white/black defendants.

2. Case-Filing Rates
How big is the misdemeanor system? In recent work, we analyzed national-level data to estimate that approximately 13.2 million misdemeanor cases—
42.6 per 1,000 people—are filed in the United States each year. 101 This estimate includes all “criminal traffic cases.” 102 We find very similar case-filing
rates in the jurisdictions studied here. The average number of misdemeanor
cases filed in 2013, including all traffic offenses tried in the main misdemeanor
court, was 40.4 per 1,000 inhabitants. 103
101

Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 745.
Id. This term leaves some room for interpretation. See id. at 739–40 (noting that “states and
localities vary tremendously in what proportion of traffic offenses, if any, they classify as ‘criminal,’
and as ‘criminal misdemeanors’”).
103
This is a weighted average across jurisdictions, where the weights correspond to population
size.
102
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This is not to say that the misdemeanor case-filing rate is the same everywhere. On the contrary, it varies substantially. In our data, the total number
of cases filed per 1,000 inhabitants varied from thirteen in Philadelphia to
eighty-five in rural Kentucky. But this large range is mostly due to differences
in the number of non-DUI traffic cases handled in the “main misdemeanor
courts”: many are handled in Kentucky and Virginia’s main courts, but few are
handled in the main misdemeanor courts in other jurisdictions. Figure 2 illustrates 2013 filing rates across our jurisdictions, broken down into traffic and
non-traffic cases. We show case-filing rates for traffic offenses only in the jurisdictions where we have access to all of them: Kentucky and Virginia. The
case-filing rates for non-traffic misdemeanor cases (including DUIs) also varied, but less so, ranging from thirteen per 1,000 inhabitants to thirty-five. The
rest of the analyses in this study exclude non-DUI traffic offenses unless otherwise noted.
Figure 2: Misdemeanor Cases per 1,000 Inhabitants (2013)

Note: This graph shows case-filing rates (annual number of cases filed per 1,000 inhabitants) for both non-traffic misdemeanor cases and, where available, traffic misdemeanor cases in
each jurisdiction. DUI is counted here as a non-traffic case.

In every jurisdiction, the most prevalent offense types by far were possession of marijuana, petty theft, DUI, and simple assault/battery. We consider these
the “big four” misdemeanor offenses. These big four offenses account for 50–
60% of cases in most jurisdictions (slightly lower in Virginia, in which the data
include a larger number of low-level misdemeanor offenses). Other common
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misdemeanor offenses were public intoxication, trespass, possession of drug
paraphernalia, prostitution, resisting arrest, underage drinking, vandalism, failing
to give information or giving false information to police, weapons possession,
possession of criminal instruments (e.g. burglary tools), threats/harassment, violation of animal laws, and general regulatory offenses.
Figure 3 shows the 2013 case-filing rates for six general offense categories: violent, theft, public-order, drug, DUI, and “other” offenses. 104 The relative frequency of these different offense categories varied considerably across
jurisdictions, but not in a highly consistent way.
Figure 3: Case-Filing Rates by Offense Type

Note: This graph shows the case-filing rates (annual number of cases filed per 1,000 inhabitants) for various misdemeanor offense categories.

Figure 4 shows time trends in the total number of violent-crime, theft,
public-order crime, and drug filings per year across the eight jurisdictions. The
time trends have been normalized to represent a percentage change from 2011.
Although the patterns are noisy, there is an overall downward trend in the yearly number of case filings in all jurisdictions. Louisville, rural Virginia, and San
Antonio all saw particularly pronounced declines in the yearly number of mis104

The Chicago data do not include DUIs.
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demeanors: a drop of more than 25% since 2011. These trends are consistent
with the time trends we have observed in national-level data. 105
Figure 4: Case-Filing Rates by Offense Type

Note: This graph shows a time trend in the misdemeanor case-filing rate (annual
number of misdemeanor cases per 1,000 inhabitants). The graph has been normalized so
that the case filing rate in each year can be interpreted as the percent of case-filing rate in
2011.

3. Charges Per Case
There was considerable variation in the frequency with which people
were charged with multiple offenses in a single case. In Chicago, most cases
were single-charge cases, 106 whereas in Philadelphia and Kentucky most cases
included multiple charges. 107 The single-charge rate in San Antonio, Houston,
and Virginia was 100%, 108 but this reflects case-filing practices rather than arrest practices; although police may arrest a person on multiple charges, each
105
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 744–55 (noting the downward trend in rates of misdemeanor case-filings rates and in arrests for likely misdemeanors offenses).
106
CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85.
107
KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83; PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82.
108
HOUSTON DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84;
VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
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charge is then filed as a separate case. Interviewees report that court clerks
sometimes try to schedule multiple cases arising out of the same arrest in tandem, but this does not always happen. 109

45

100

100

48

49

Avg. # charges

1.4

1

1

1.85

1

1

2.04

2.19

Rural KY

100

Louisville

100

Rural VA

76

Fairfax

San Antonio

% cases with 1 charge

Chicago

Houston

Philadelphia

Table 5: Charges per Case

4. Defense Representation Rates
The court records did not contain consistent data on defense representation. A defense attorney was listed on more than 90% of cases in Philadelphia,
and interviewees reported that misdemeanor defendants always have counsel
present unless they insist on self-representation. 110 Interviewees from Houston,
San Antonio, and Chicago reported that virtually all misdemeanor defendants
in those jurisdictions have access to counsel as well, 111 but we could not independently verify this in the data.
In Virginia, the records document that only 55–60% of misdemeanor defendants had counsel. Though a large majority of the Virginia cases were regulatory or public-order charges unlikely to result in prison sentences, around 8%
109
Telephone Interview with Nicole Galioto, Special Projects and Training Specialist for the
Fairfax Cty. Gen. Dist. Court (Sept. 3, 2017) (with respect to Virginia); Telephone Interview with
Susanne Pringle, Senior Staff Attorney, Tex. Fair Def. Project (Apr. 28, 2018) (with respect to Houston); Telephone Interview with Judge Tommy Stolhandske, Bexar Cty., Tex., Cty. Court 11, and
Amy Castano, Court Coordinator, Bexar Cty., Tex., Cty. Court 11 (Sept. 14, 2017) (with respect to
San Antonio).
110
Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, Counsel, Def. Ass’n of Phila. (Nov. 6, 2017); Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Derek Riker, Deputy
Inspector Gen., City of Phila. (Oct. 2, 2017).
111
Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64 (with respect to Houston); Telephone
Interview with Mike Morrissey, supra note 64 (with respect to Chicago); Telephone Interview with
Susanne Pringle, supra note 109 (with respect to Houston); Telephone Interview with Parlé RoeTaylor, Chief, Cook Cty. Pub. Def. (Oct. 12, 2017) (with respect to Chicago); Telephone Interview
with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109 (with respect to San Antonio); Telephone
Interview with Alexa Van Brunt, Attorney, MacArthur Justice Ctr. (Aug. 25, 2017) (with respect to
Chicago).
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of those who received a carceral sentence in Fairfax and 11% of those who
received a carceral sentence in rural Virginia did not have a defense attorney
listed on their docket. It is unclear whether these gaps reflect missing data or
missing attorneys.
Attorney information was not available in the Kentucky data. Interviewees reported that a public defender should be appointed for any indigent defendant in Kentucky at risk of a loss of liberty, although actual practice might
vary by county. 112
It is important to note that our data do not specify the precise point at
which an attorney was appointed and present. Interviews suggest, for instance,
that defense representation at bail hearings was relatively rare in the years our
data cover. 113 Research in other jurisdictions has found that misdemeanor
courts sometimes appoint counsel only after a defendant has announced her
intention to plead not guilty. 114 A notation reflecting defense counsel alone
therefore provides somewhat limited information.
5. Case Duration
Jurisdictions also varied in the amount of time between when the case is
first filed and when it is finally disposed. With the exception of the San Antonio area, more than three-quarters of cases in all jurisdictions were resolved
within six months. 115 In the Houston area, more than a third of cases were resolved within two weeks. 116 In Fairfax and rural Virginia, fewer than 7% of
cases were decided within two weeks. 117 Cases with deferred adjudication do
not show a final resolution date until the supervisory period has elapsed, a fact
that explains the long time-to-disposition for some cases.

112

Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, Manager, Ky. Dep’t of the Pub. Advocate (Apr. 5,

2018).
113

See supra Table 2; infra Appendix A.
See generally State Bar of Ga. Indigent Def. Comm., Report on the Status of Indigent Defense
Representation in the Misdemeanor Courts of Georgia (June 18, 2018) (unpublished report) (on file
with authors).
115
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions
studied).
116
HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82.
117
VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
114
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Figure 5: Time to Disposition

Note: This graph shows the fraction of misdemeanor cases that are adjudicated within two
weeks and six months, respectively.

6. Trial and Conviction Rates
In all jurisdictions except Philadelphia, only a miniscule percentage of misdemeanor cases were tried. 118 Conviction rates varied widely across jurisdictions, from a low of 27% in Chicago to a high of 72% in rural Kentucky. Considering the infrequency of cases going to trial, with the exception of Philadelphia, these conviction rates essentially represent the rate of conviction by guilty
plea.
It is important to remember that these numbers represent rates of conviction among cases filed, rather than among arrests. Some of the variation in
conviction rates might derive from jurisdictional differences in how many cases prosecutors filter out at the charging stage. In Houston, for instance, an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) is always on call to make charging decisions.
Arresting officers promptly call the DA’s office to report an arrest, and an ADA
determines whether or not to “take” the charges. 119 This pre-case-filing filtering mechanism might be part of the explanation for Houston’s relatively high
118
Fewer than 1% in all jurisdictions. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing
datasets for all eight jurisdictions studied).
119
Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64.
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conviction rate. Yet the Kentucky jurisdictions we studied also have high conviction rates, and interviewees report that prosecutors do not make an independent
charging decision in Kentucky; the charges at arrest simply proceed to court. 120
Table 6: Conviction Rates
Chicago

San Antonio

Rural VA

Fairfax

Philadelphia

Louisville

Houston

Rural
KY

27%

38%

50%

51%

55%

61%

69%

72%

In cases with no conviction recorded, the case resolution is documented
as dismissed, diverted, or adjudication deferred. In San Antonio, 25% of misdemeanors have a deferred adjudication. In the other jurisdictions it is difficult
to distinguish between dismissal, diversion, and deferred adjudication with the
data available. Our interviews suggest that diversion and deferred adjudication
are common in most jurisdictions.
7. Racial Disparities
Figure 6 shows the number of misdemeanor cases filed in 2013 per 1,000
inhabitants, categorized by race and offense. Figure 7, which shows the blackwhite ratio in the per-capita number of cases filed in 2013 by offense type,
shows these disparities even more clearly. For most jurisdictions and most offenses, there is a large racial discrepancy in the per-capita number of cases.
The Chicago area had the most extreme racial disparities. 121 The percapita misdemeanor case rate for black defendants in Chicago was about five
times that of white defendants for violent, theft, and other offenses. 122 For drug
and public-order offenses, the per-capita case rate was about twelve times
higher for blacks than whites. 123 In contrast, Philadelphia had the lowest rates
of racial disparities. 124 The per-capita case-filing rate in Philadelphia was close
to equal for black and white defendants across the various offense categories. 125 In the other jurisdictions, for most of the other offenses, with the exception of DUIs, which exhibited relatively low racial disparities, the black-white
per-capita case-filing ratio ranged from two to four. 126

120
Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, Staff Attorney, Boone Cty. Trial Office, Ky. Dep’t
of Pub. Advocacy (Aug. 10, 2018).
121
CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82.
125
Id.
126
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions
studied).
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Figure 6: Cases Filed per 1,000 Inhabitants by Race and Offense

Note: This graph shows the case-filing rates by misdemeanor-offense category and race.
For example, the white case-filing rate for drug offenses is the annual number of drug cases in
which the defendant is white per 1,000 white inhabitants.
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Figure 7: Black-White Case-Filing Rate Ratio

Note: This graph shows the black-white ratio in misdemeanor case-filing rates by offense
category. This is defined as the per capita case-filing rate for black defendants divided by the per
capita case-filing rate for white defendants. For example, the black-white ratio in theft cases
would be the theft case-filing rate for black defendants (the annual number of theft cases in
which the defendant is black per 1,000 black inhabitants) divided by the theft case-filing rate for
white defendants (the annual number of theft cases in which the defendant is white per 1,000
white inhabitants).

There was much less racial disparity in the conviction rates. Figure 8
shows racial disparities in the likelihood of being convicted. There is no consistent pattern. In several of the jurisdictions the conviction rate for black defendants is higher. In others, the conviction rate is higher for white defendants.
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Figure 8: Conviction Rates by Race

Note: This graph shows the percentage of cases that result in a conviction by race.

B. Bond and Pretrial Detention
Virtually all misdemeanor cases in our datasets for the Chicago, Houston,
San Antonio, and Philadelphia areas originated as an arrest by a police officer
rather than a summons or citation. 127 In Kentucky, however, about one third of
cases originated with a summons or citation, 128 and 42% and 50% originated
with summons in Fairfax and in rural Virginia, respectively. 129 This discrepancy is partly explained by the kinds of offenses our datasets cover—that is, the
kinds of non-traffic offenses adjudicated in the “main misdemeanor courts” in
each jurisdiction. In Kentucky and Virginia, jurisdictions with relatively higher
rates of cases originating with a summons or citation, our data include all state
and municipal misdemeanors.130 A substantial proportion of municipal offenses
are relatively less serious than the average state-law misdemeanor. In the other
jurisdictions, the main misdemeanor court principally adjudicates state-law
offenses that carry potential sentences of imprisonment.
Among defendants arrested, booked, and brought to a bail hearing (the
large majority of defendants in the Chicago, Houston, San Antonio, and Phila127
CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85; HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; PA DOCKET
SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
128
KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83.
129
VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
130
KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83; VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
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delphia areas and 50–66% of cases in Kentucky and Virginia), there is wide
discrepancy in bond practices. 131 Figure 9 shows bond amounts for arrested
defendants in each of the eight jurisdictions. The fraction of defendants released without having to pay monetary bond ranges from essentially zero in
San Antonio and Houston to near 60% in Fairfax, rural Virginia, Philadelphia,
and the Chicago area. 132 Most bonds are less than or equal to $5,000, although
bonds at $25,000 and above are not unheard of in most jurisdictions.
Figure 9: Bond Amounts

Note: This graph shows the percentage of misdemeanor cases with bond set at different
levels. The sample is limited to misdemeanor cases that result in an arrest and booking; cases in
which the defendant is merely issued a summons are omitted from this analysis.

Figure 10 shows the fraction of defendants who remain detained pretrial
for at least three days at various levels of bond. Most defendants who remain
detained for at least three days are detained until the case is resolved. Even at
relatively low amounts of bond—$500—the fraction who remain detained is
131
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions
studied).
132
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (same).
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quite high, ranging from 20–50% in the jurisdictions for which these data are
available. In general, the fraction detained increases as bond amounts go up. At
$5,000, 53–78% of defendants remain detained. It is important to note that
bond practices vary across these jurisdictions. In Philadelphia, defendants must
only pay a 10% deposit to secure release. 133 Thus, a defendant with a $5,000
bond must only pay $500 to secure her release. In Houston, a defendant can
borrow bail money from a bondsman. 134 In Kentucky, bondsmen have been
outlawed. 135 This likely explains why the detention rates per bond amount are
usually higher in Kentucky than in the other jurisdictions.
Figure 10: Fraction of Defendants Detained Three Days or
More at Various Bond Amounts

Note: This graph shows the percentage of defendants who are detained for three days or
more by bond amount. For example, about 47% of defendants in rural Kentucky with bond set at
$500 are detained for three days or more.

133

Telephone Interview with Alexa Van Brunt, supra note 111.
Cf. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 1704.001–.306 (West 2019) (providing regulations of bail bond
sureties).
135
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510(1) (West 2019).
134
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Figure 11 shows racial differences in the likelihood of posting a given
bond amount. For each of the common bond amounts, we compare the fraction
of white defendants with that bond who post bail with the fraction of black
defendants with the same bond who post bail. The graph shows the difference
between the fraction of white and black defendants who post at a given bond
amount. Although racial disparities vary, the lines in the graph are often above
zero, suggesting that white defendants are more likely to post bond than black
defendants. This is particularly pronounced in San Antonio and, at higher bond
amounts, in Philadelphia. Neither the Louisville area nor rural Kentucky exhibits consistent evidence of racial disparities in bond-posting rates. The difference bounces around between positive and negative and generally remains
close to zero.
Figure 11: White-Black Differences in Bail-Posting Rate

Note: This graph shows racial disparities in the likelihood of posting various amounts of
bail. For example, if 60% of white defendants with bail set at $500 were able to post, but only
40% of black defendants with $500 bail were able to post, there would be a 20-percentage-point
difference in the bail-posting rate shown on the graph.
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C. Sentencing
The criminal justice consequences of a conviction vary hugely across jurisdictions. Figure 12 shows that in the San Antonio and Houston areas, respectively, 65% and 80% of all convictions result in a jail sentence. 136 In Virginia, a much smaller percentage of convictions (12–17%) result in a jail sentence. 137 The length of the jail sentence also varies, although they all tend to be
relatively short. With a median of five days, Chicago has the shortest jail sentences. 138 Philadelphia and San Antonio have the longest jail sentences, with a
median of thirty days. 139
Figure 12: Incarceration Rates and Lengths

Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of misdemeanor defendants sentenced to
jail, and sentenced to jail if convicted, respectively. The graph on the right shows the median
sentence, in days, for those who received a carceral sentence.

Figure 13 shows that there is also considerable variation in the percentage
of convicted defendants who are sentenced to probation. This data is only
available for four jurisdictions. Fairfax and rural Virginia both place more than
20% of convicted defendants on probation; San Antonio places 35% of convicted defendants on probation, and Houston only places about 15%. The median probation length is one year in all jurisdictions.

136

HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
138
CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85.
139
PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
137
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Figure 13: Probation Rates and Lengths

Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of misdemeanor defendants sentenced to
probation, and the percentage sentenced to probation if convicted, respectively. The graph on the
right shows the median probation length, in days, among those who were assigned to probation.

Figure 14 shows that there is also considerable variation in the use of
fines. Fines are relatively uncommon in Kentucky and Chicago, but ubiquitous
and steep in the San Antonio area.
Figure 14: Fines

Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of misdemeanor defendants who
receive a fine, and the percentage of misdemeanor defendants who receive a fine if
convicted, respectively. The graph on the right shows the median fine, in dollars,
among defendants who received a fine.
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Finally, Figure 15 shows that virtually all convicted defendants in the jurisdictions for which these data are available are required to pay court costs if
convicted. The median court costs range from around $100 in Virginia to more
than $500 in Philadelphia.
Figure 15: Court Costs

Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of defendants who are charged court
costs, and the percentage of defendants who are charged court costs if convicted, respectively.
The graph on the right shows the median court cost, in dollars, for those who are charged court
costs.

III. WHAT THE NUMBERS REVEAL
Several key takeaways emerge from the numbers. For the most part, they
substantiate claims about misdemeanor justice that other scholars have made: the
misdemeanor systems in these jurisdictions affect a tremendous number of people, and they disproportionately affect people of color. 140 The data also reveal
both dramatic variation and structural similarly across misdemeanor systems.
A. The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice (Again) 141
The first notable fact the data reveal is no surprise: the volume of misdemeanor cases is very high. As noted above, if the 2013 data, averaged across
140
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 99 (discussing the profound imbalance within the criminal justice system towards people of color).
141
See generally Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14.
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jurisdictions, were representative of contemporary practice nationwide, there
would be more than 13 million misdemeanor cases filed annually, or 40.4 per
1,000 people. This estimate accords with our prior estimate on the basis of data
collected from thirty-four states by the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) 142 as well as with Professor Alexandra Natapoff’s national estimate
for 2015. 143 By the NCSC’s accounting, misdemeanor cases represent approximately three-quarters of the criminal justice cases processed in the United
States. 144
Affirming other estimates of national misdemeanor case-filing rates may
seem like an incremental contribution. Nevertheless, given the dearth of empirical information about misdemeanor justice, the consistency of these estimates
is reassuring. Prior estimates—our own and others—relied on jurisdictions’
self-reporting of case-filing totals. 145 It is not always clear how various jurisdictions tally their misdemeanor cases or what data they use to do so. 146 The
fact that an extrapolation from individual records in eight jurisdictions comes
out to approximately the same number suggests that the national estimates are
on target. 147
The case-level records assessed here are also consistent with our prior
finding that the misdemeanor system has been shrinking. 148 Although the
timespan of these data is limited, case-filing rates declined for each of the eight
jurisdictions over the time they cover. These trends are consistent with national

142

Id. at 745.
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 17, at 41, 258; Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012, supra note 6, at 1320–21 (suggesting that a report estimating that there are 10.5 million nontraffic misdemeanor cases per year is likely an underestimate).
144
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATEWIDE CRIMINAL CASELOAD COMPOSITION IN 31
STATES 1 (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/Criminal/PDFs/EWSC2016-CRIM-Page-2-Comp.ashx [https://perma.cc/Z7Z9-9DCX].
145
See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 736–37 (explaining that the primary source
of the misdemeanor data analyzed was “publishable” data from thirty-two states and Washington,
D.C. as well as state court publications).
146
Moreover, the NCSC directs states to follow certain procedures that we did not in this analysis. For instance, it instructs states to count all charges relating to a single incident for a defendant as a
single case, not to classify a charge as a misdemeanor if the offense is punishable by incarceration for
more than one year, and not to count “violations of local ordinances” as misdemeanors (even if they
are designated as “misdemeanors” by local law). COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 14–22, 34–37 (2019), http://www.
courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide%20to%20Statistical%20
Reporting.ashx [https://perma.cc/V95S-ZZM4].
147
Prior estimates were calculated by tabulating misdemeanor caseload in states that report such
information to the NCSC, and inferring misdemeanor caseload for non-reporting states based on similar reporting states and/or information reported by state courts. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT
CRIME, supra note 17, at 258; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 736–37.
148
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 764–69.
143
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data. 149 They are also consistent with the trends in misdemeanor arrest rates
recently reported in California, New York, Seattle, St. Louis, Louisville,
Durham, and Prince George’s County. 150
The ongoing decline in misdemeanor case-filing rates does stand in tension with the narrative of an expanding misdemeanor system that some recent
misdemeanor scholarship has suggested. 151 As we have discussed elsewhere,
misdemeanor scholarship has been heavily influenced by empirical work in
New York City, where the misdemeanor system experienced considerable
growth in the 1990s and early 2000s. 152 We hope that future scholarship will
explore the causes of the declining caseloads and their implications for how we
understand misdemeanor justice.
B. Misdemeanor Injustice
The data surveyed here also, unfortunately, affirm conventional wisdom
about the effects of money bail and the disproportionate racial impact of misdemeanor systems. 153 The use of money bail resulted in pretrial detention for the
majority of defendants even with bail set at relatively low amounts. At $500 bail,
25% of Houston defendants and almost 50% of Philadelphia, Louisville, and
rural Kentucky defendants remained jailed for three days or more. 154 At $5,000
bail, roughly 55% of Philadelphia and Houston defendants, 155 68% of Louisville
defendants, 156 and almost 80% of rural Kentucky defendants remained in jail for
at least three days. 157 This is despite the fact that Philadelphia defendants need
only have posted 10% of the bail amount to be released, and commercial bail

149

See id. (reporting that the number of misdemeanor arrests and cases is declining nationwide).
See Jacob Gershman, Arrests for Low-Level Crimes Are Plummeting, and the Experts Are Flummoxed, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/arrests-for-low-level-crimes-areplummeting-and-the-experts-are-flummoxed-11570354201 [https://perma.cc/9MRG-SR5W] (discussing
the falling rates of misdemeanor cases in New York, California, St. Louis, Durham, and Seattle); supra
notes 25–26.
151
See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 620–21 (describing urban
courts as “flooded . . . with low-level cases”); Roberts, supra note 9, at 281 (suggesting that “misdemeanors are . . . on the rise”).
152
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 765; see also PATTEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 13
(noting that “[f]rom 1980 to 2010, the rates of misdemeanor arrests in New York City surged from
1,389 to 4,351 per 100,000, a 213 percent increase”).
153
See generally David Arnold et al., Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1885
(2018) (discussing and analyzing the racial biases towards black defendants in judges’ bail decisions
and the resulting consequences).
154
HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83; PA DOCKET
SHEETS, supra note 82.
155
HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82.
156
KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83.
157
Id.
150
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bondsmen operate in Houston. 158 The data suggest that even these low-end bail
amounts are beyond the reach of many misdemeanor defendants, regardless of
whether there is a deposit or commercial surety regime in place.
The racial disparities in this data are equally stark. With a single exception (DUIs in the Houston area), the per-capita misdemeanor case-filing rate is
higher for black people than for white people for every offense type, in every
jurisdiction. For most offenses, the per-capita case-filing rate for blacks is two
to four times that of whites. The result is that, relative to the general population, black people are overrepresented among misdemeanor defendants in every single jurisdiction. The disparities are least marked in Philadelphia. They
are most pronounced in Chicago.
We cannot say to what extent these disparities result from underlying differences in rates of offending, and to what extent they result from underlying
differences in rates of arrest and charging that are unrelated to differences in
offending. Such differences in arrest or charging rates might arise from concentrated policing in minority neighborhoods, 159 or from implicit or explicit
racial bias. They also might depend on whether the suburban towns surrounding a major city—which often have higher white populations and less concentrated street-policing—are included in that city’s misdemeanor court data.
Misdemeanor courts in the Chicago and Houston areas include the surrounding
suburban towns; Philadelphia misdemeanor courts serve only Philadelphians.
Disentangling the source of the disparities, however, would require a great deal
more research.
Finally, some jurisdictions also demonstrate significant racial disparities
in the likelihood of pretrial detention (of at least three days) at a given monetary amount. At bail amounts of $5,000 or less, black defendants are thirteen to
eighteen percentage points more likely to remain in jail than white defendants
in San Antonio. 160 In Philadelphia, black defendants are five to seventeen percentage points more likely to remain detained at bail amounts of at least
$5,000. 161 As noted above, the fact that this pattern is found at higher bail
amounts in Philadelphia may be due to the deposit system, which means that
the functional bail amount in any case is 10% of that officially set. Interestingly, there is no discernable pattern of racial disparity in the likelihood of posting
bail in Kentucky.
158
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the bond systems in Philadelphia
and Houston).
159
Cf. Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 635 (noting that “quality-of-life
policing is intensely spatially concentrated in neighborhoods with high crime rates and high minority
populations”).
160
SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.
161
PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82.
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C. Uniformity Amid Variation
There is a common perception among misdemeanor scholars that misdemeanor systems are wildly heterogeneous, 162 and, to some extent, the data
bears that out. There was dramatic variation across jurisdictions on almost all
of the dimensions we measured. To cite a few examples: The conviction rate
ranged from a low of 27% in Chicago to a high of 72% in rural Kentucky. In
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Kentucky, many cases involved multiple charges;
in Virginia and Texas, cases involved only one charge. In Houston, more than a
third of cases were resolved within two weeks; in Philadelphia and Virginia,
less than 5% were. Pretrial release without financial conditions was common
in six jurisdictions—indeed, a majority of defendants in Virginia, Philadelphia,
and Chicago were released without bail—but next to nonexistent in the Texas
counties. Relatively few convicted defendants were sentenced to jail in Philadelphia and Virginia (12–24%); in San Antonio and Houston, large majorities
were (65% and 85%, respectively). Philadelphia’s median sentence—thirty
days—was three or more times that of Kentucky, Fairfax, or Chicago. These
differences in the data almost certainly reflect underlying differences at several
levels: the substantive law defining misdemeanors and governing enforcement,
the institutional arrangements for enforcement, the demographics of the jurisdiction, and local practice. 163 This fact and its implications are discussed in
more detail in Part IV.B.
But despite the variation, the eight jurisdictions also had a set of deep
structural features in common. As discussed above, 164 several offense types
were prevalent in all jurisdictions: possession of marijuana, simple assault (often domestic violence), petty larceny (often shoplifting), and DUI. Other
common offenses included disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, prostitution,
vandalism, trespass, public intoxication, underage drinking, and unlawful possession of weapons, drug paraphernalia, or crime tools. Although these were
not uniformly processed as misdemeanors in all jurisdictions (as opposed to
summary offenses or municipal violations), they were common enough to belong at the core of any definition of misdemeanor criminal justice. Certain aspects of misdemeanor case processing were common as well. All jurisdictions
162
See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 256 (stating that the misdemeanor
justice system “is neither uniform nor consistent”).
163
In the Philadelphia data, for instance, the relative dearth of public-order cases, prevalence of
drug cases, and high median sentence are due to the city’s classification of “misdemeanors,” which
includes more serious crimes such as non-marijuana drug possession and some drug distribution offenses. The fact that non-jailable traffic and municipal offenses are adjudicated alongside more serious
misdemeanors in Kentucky and Virginia explains the fact that only slightly over half of misdemeanor
defendants are represented.
164
See supra notes 99–119 and accompanying text.
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used money bail as a condition of pretrial release for a large portion of defendants. Virtually no cases went to jury trial. Defendants who were required to pay
money bail often remained detained pretrial. Defendants who were convicted
were required to pay court costs. And the misdemeanor case-filing rate for the
four core misdemeanor offense categories fell in every jurisdiction over the
years for which we have data.
The moral of the story, we think, is that misdemeanor systems are both
alike and unalike. It is never safe to extrapolate from one jurisdiction to another. On the other hand, it is equally ill-advised to assume that every misdemeanor system is entirely unique or that local practices wholly determine the
shape of misdemeanor justice.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF HETEROGENEITY
In addition to aggregate trends, detailed misdemeanor court data afford a
closer look at the species of study itself—the misdemeanor offense. Section A
of this Part considers what light the data shed on a question raised by other
misdemeanor scholarship: 165 To what extent are misdemeanor crimes wholly in
the eye of the beholder (i.e. the police or the prosecutor)? Section B explores a
second question raised by this research project: 166 Is “misdemeanor” a useful
category for scholarship at all?
A. Schrödinger’s Crime?
The reinvigoration of misdemeanor scholarship in the last few years has
given rise to questions about the nature of misdemeanor offenses themselves.
The uninitiated might assume that a misdemeanor is simply a less serious
crime than a felony—a mini-felony, as it were. But scholars like Alexandra
Natapoff, Jenny Roberts, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, and Eisha Jain have offered
compelling evidence that misdemeanor law enforcement serves fundamentally
different purposes than felony law enforcement. To radically simplify their
work and do justice to none of it, each has argued, from a different angle, that
the state deploys the machinery of misdemeanor criminal justice primarily to
exercise social control over populations perceived as disorderly and dangerous
rather than to impose deserved punishment for specific bad acts. 167 They have
165

See infra notes 167–188 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189–199 and accompanying text.
167
See generally Jain, supra note 17, at 826–44 (noting the many ways in which arrests have
become a tool to regulate rather than as a means to properly enforce the criminal justice system);
Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 619–29 (arguing that by enforcing misdemeanors under a “managerial model,” courts regulate populations rather than criminal acts); Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Misdemeanor Theory and Practice, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL
166
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each made variations on Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon’s argument that
the misdemeanor justice system has produced a “new penology” that emphasizes surveillance rather than punishment. 168
This literature is diverse, but one central theme is that misdemeanor law
enforcement patterns do not reflect the underlying incidence of crime. Rather,
arrest and prosecution patterns reflect police and prosecutors’ judgments about
which individuals and populations are so disorderly or dangerous as to require
the state’s coercive control.169 These judgments are always colored by race and
class. Thus, misdemeanor enforcement disproportionately targets the poor and
the disenfranchised, and especially poor people of color. 170 Misdemeanor offenses permit this kind of selective enforcement, because they are both trivial
and amorphous. If people commit misdemeanors all the time (like traffic violations), or if anyone might be said to be committing a misdemeanor because of
its ill-defined nature (like disorderly conduct), then the discretionary choices of
police and prosecutors wholly determine which incidents are designated as
“criminal.” Misdemeanors, on this view, are Schrödinger’s crime: Their existence is determined at the moment they are perceived. They are created by arrest and prosecution. 171

LAW (Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2016), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.
1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-9 [https://perma.cc/WW8SFYSM] (arguing that misdemeanors are treated as a regulatory mechanism and are enforced with
significant discretion when compared to “the requirements of culpability and due process that traditionally constrain criminal law”); Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 264 (arguing that
“the misdemeanor system permits a regulatory social control agenda to proceed under the formal aegis
of criminal law”).
168
See Feeley & Simon, supra note 6, at 449 (discussing the increasing focus on group management and surveillance in the criminal justice system instead of punishing individual bad acts).
169
See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 643–44, 646 (suggesting
that prosecutors use the criminal justice system to “sort and regulate the . . . people who flow through
the courts” rather than for “determining guilt or innocence and imposing sanctions accordingly”);
Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 263–64 (stating that “[p]opulation management, not
guilt, is the primary concern, as police, prosecutors, and courts iteratively mark and keep tabs on populations considered risky”).
170
See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 262–63 (arguing that “[m]isdemeanors
are . . . one of the concrete mechanisms through which the US criminal system engages in the group
criminalization of disadvantaged populations”).
171
See, e.g., id. at 256 (describing misdemeanor justice as “dominated by police arrest practices and
assembly-line processing”); Abdallah Fayyad, The Criminalization of Gentrifying Neighborhoods, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/the-criminalization-ofgentrifying-neighborhoods/548837/ [https://perma.cc/4GTG-ZTBU] (suggesting that the number of
misdemeanor arrests in a given area is a better indicator of the number of police officers on patrol in that
area than the amount of crime committed).
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Our prior work evaluating national-level data complicates that narrative. If misdemeanor enforcement were driven by highly subjective police
and prosecutorial decision making, one would expect enforcement patterns to
vary with local conditions and culture. But the national data show some remarkably consistent trends. Misdemeanor case-filing rates have been falling
for at least a decade. 173 Misdemeanor arrest rates have been falling for at least
two decades in almost every likely-misdemeanor offense category. 174 Arrest
rates for our misdemeanor index have been falling in almost every state for
which data are available. 175 In fact, misdemeanor arrest trends look not unlike
broader crime trends. 176 These patterns suggest that, at least to some extent, misdemeanor justice is shaped by factors exogenous to any particular jurisdiction.
The data evaluated in this Article add further complexity. On the one
hand, misdemeanors that look like mini-felonies—assault/battery, theft, and
DUI—make up a substantial proportion (26–55%) of the cases in our analysis, 177 as they do in the national-level data. 178 These offenses seem relatively
objective in the scheme of things. There are blood-alcohol thresholds for
DUI. 179 Theft generally involves physical property and a complaining witness. 180 Battery usually involves physical contact. 181 A charge for any one is
typically based on something other than a police officer’s unsubstantiated tes172

172
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 744–63 (presenting the results of a study of national
misdemeanor case-filing rates and arrest rates for offenses that are likely to be classified as misdemeanors).
173
Id. at 765.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 771.
176
See Tim Lau, Crime Rates in Largest U.S. Cities Continue to Drop, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 12, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/crime-rates-largest-uscities-continue-drop [https://perma.cc/8DKP-W5FM] (reporting that the crime rates in the largest
cities in the United States continued to decline in 2018, including rates of violent crime and murder).
177
Again, if one excludes non-DUI traffic offenses.
178
We do not consider marijuana possession a mini-felony because it is widely considered nonculpable, is increasingly legal, and is subject to considerable discretion in arrest and prosecution. See
German Lopez, 15 States Have Decriminalized—But Not Legalized—Marijuana, VOX (July 10, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/20/17938358/marijuana-legalization-decriminalization-statesmap [https://perma.cc/5HKD-APMD] (noting that marijuana is legal in eleven states as well as Washington, D.C. and has been decriminalized in fifteen states).
179
See BAC Legal Limits in Different States, Counties, & Cities, ALCOHOL.ORG, https://www.
alcohol.org/dui/bac-limits/ [https://perma.cc/VY3C-K6HE] (last updated Dec. 18, 2019) (listing the
legal alcohol limits for each state in the United States).
180
See Theft, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7 (defining theft as the “wrongful taking
and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of depriving the true owner of it”).
181
See Battery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7 (defining battery as “any unlawful
beating, or other wrongful physical violence or constraint, inflicted on a human being without his
consent”).
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timony. These common misdemeanor offenses are not prototypical Schrödinger’s crimes.
To say that these offenses are relatively objective does not mean they are
wholly objective, though, and it is extremely difficult to know to what extent
they are enforced disproportionately against poor people or people of color. As
always, the problem is that we cannot see underlying offense rates. In the data
studied here, DUI case-filing rates were more or less equivalent across racial
groups in all eight jurisdictions. That might mean that DUI enforcement accurately reflects DUI offending. Alternatively, it might be that white people
commit DUI at higher rates, but the laws are enforced disproportionately
against black people. Or vice versa. Similarly, as noted above, the racial disparities in case-filing rates for theft and violent misdemeanor offenses could
reflect either disparities in underlying offense rates or racial distortion in enforcement. 182 Professor Babe Howell has documented how arrests for certain
theft offenses, like shoplifting, and certain violent offenses, like harassment,
increased in New York City on days when police deployed additional patrols. 183 She hypothesizes that when more police officers are on patrol, shoplifters are more likely to be arrested and harassment and contempt of court
complaints are more likely to be pursued. 184 The category of “theft” also includes theft-of-services charges like fare evasion, or turnstile jumping, which
was a major target for zero-tolerance policing in New York City 185—and possibly elsewhere. In sum, the prevalence of “mini-felony” offenses in all eight
misdemeanor systems is a counterweight to the Schrödinger’s-crime narrative,
but it is hardly determinative.
On the other hand, the data also included sizable numbers of marijuana
possession and public-order cases, including disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and trespass. These have more potential as Schrodinger’s crimes. And indeed, national data suggest that drug possession laws are enforced disproportionately against black people relative to rates of offending, at least on a na182
It might be possible to compare case-filing rates for theft and simple assault against rates of
offending inferred from crime victimization surveys, like the National Crime Victimization Survey.
See Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 [https://perma.cc/T7HR-Q2Y6] (reporting on
statistical data taken from interviews with the victims of criminal acts).
183
K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive OrderMaintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 288–89 (2009).
184
See id. at 289 (“On days when more police officers are on regular duty, discretion will more
likely be exercised in favor of arresting shoplifters. Police may follow up on complaints for contempt
of court or harassment.”).
185
See id. at 288 (noting that approximately 11% of arrests on a busy day in New York City were
for turnstile jumping); Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 631–33 (describing
New York City Mayor Giuliani’s strict approach towards low-level crime, which included “vigorous
enforcement of minor prohibitions, such as turnstile jumping”).
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tional scale. 186 Although non-DUI traffic offenses are not included in most of
the analysis here, they also may be subject to substantial discrepancy in enforcement. Perhaps it is these offense types that most directly facilitate the selective enforcement that contemporary scholars describe.
If drug and public-order offense types lend themselves to race- and classskewed policing, we might expect to see greater racial disparity in case-filing
rates for these offenses than for others. 187 The Chicago data support this hypothesis. In Chicago, the case-filing rates for drug and public-order offenses
were more than twelve times higher for black people than for white, whereas
they were a mere five-to-six times higher for theft and violent offenses. Elsewhere, though, the data do not comply. With the exception of DUIs, which uniformly had lower rates of racial disparity, there is no consistent relationship in
the data between offense type and degree of racial disparity. 188
Overall, the data assessed here suggest that the Schrödinger’s crime narrative is more likely to be true of some offense categories than others, in some
places more than others. Though these data alone do not provide any clear answers, they do offer a starting point for further research.
B. The Study of “Misdemeanor” Justice
Any quantitative study begins with the simple question of what data to
evaluate. In this study, the question was not so simple. We set out to study
“misdemeanors.” But “misdemeanor” is an ill-defined category. It maps only
loosely onto a particular set of behaviors. Some actions—possession of marijuana, for instance—might be categorized as a felony in one jurisdiction, a
misdemeanor in another, a summary offense or civil violation in a third, and a
legal activity in a fourth. 189 For researchers and policymakers interested in un-

186
See Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 298–300 (2015) (reporting on the higher arrest rates of people of color for drug crimes compared with white individuals).
187
At least if any racial disparities in underlying offending rates were constant across offense
types.
188
Because the categories used in this Article are fairly broad, there may be more consistent racial disparity patterns in more narrowly defined offense categories. See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson,
supra note 14, at 763–71 (reporting on racial disparities in arrest rates for specific offenses including
but not limited to gambling, prostitution, and drunkenness).
189
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405 (2019) (stating that possession or use of marijuana is a “class 6 felony”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1422 (West 2019) (stating that possession of
marijuana is a Class B misdemeanor); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601.1 (West 2019) (stating
that possession or use of under ten grams of marijuana “is not a criminal conviction for any purpose”);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06 (West 2019) (permitting the charging officer to issue a
summons rather than make an arrest for possession of four ounces or less of marijuana).
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derstanding low-level criminal justice, the question of what to include in the
“misdemeanor” bucket is challenging on both practical and conceptual levels. 190
A first possibility is to include only those offenses explicitly classified as
misdemeanors by the laws of a particular jurisdiction—that is, to think of
“misdemeanor” as a legal designation. But this definition is both thin and impractical. It is thin, because a legal designation has little meaning beyond its
real-world consequences. And the real-world consequences of the legal designation “misdemeanor” vary dramatically both across and within jurisdictions.
For example, the maximum carceral sentence for a misdemeanor conviction is
five years in Pennsylvania, but only one year in Illinois. 191 Within a jurisdiction, both state and municipal law can contain offenses labeled as misdemeanors, and such offenses might be adjudicated in any one of multiple courts: a
state criminal court, municipal court, a dedicated traffic court, and so forth.192
The experience of being arrested and prosecuted for a misdemeanor varies
tremendously depending on local practices and the procedures of the particular
court in which one lands. Some misdemeanors, particularly minor traffic and
regulatory offenses, are typically processed in much the same way as speeding
tickets. 193 A court appearance may not be mandatory, pretrial detention is rare,
and jail sentences are not authorized. 194 Other misdemeanors are processed
more like felony criminal cases, and most fall somewhere in between. Another
way of putting the point is that limiting study to those offenses designated as
“misdemeanors” achieves clear but somewhat meaningless boundaries, because the term is broad and different jurisdictions use it differently. 195
For purposes of empirical study, defining “misdemeanor” as a legal designation is also impractical. Records for the many different courts within each
jurisdiction are often collected and stored in separate data systems. Identifying
and obtaining records from all of the different data sources within a particular
system that handle charges legally designated as misdemeanors would be extremely challenging. 196
190
See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 255–57 (describing the challenges
in studying the U.S. misdemeanor system, including its inconsistency and nonuniformity).
191
Compare 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2019) (stating that the maximum term
of imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor is one year), with 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 106 (West 2019) (stating that the maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor is five years).
192
See supra Table 2.
193
In twenty-five states, speeding is a misdemeanor. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME,
supra note 17, at 45.
194
Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1077–89
(2015) (discussing the range of forms that a decriminalized misdemeanor or infraction can take).
195
See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 256–57 (noting the definitional chaos in
low-level criminal law).
196
It might also seem appealing to try to collect comprehensive data on court cases by offense
type (“traffic,” “public-order,” “violent,” etc.), ignoring the legal offense-class designation and the
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If the goal is to understand how low-level criminal-case processing operates on the ground, a more conceptually satisfying approach might be to define
a category for study on the basis of what actually matters to the individuals
accused: the practical effects of a given charge. Researchers might attempt to
delineate a class of proceedings to analyze on the basis of criteria like the likelihood of arrest, likelihood of pretrial detention, onerousness of contesting the
charge, maximum authorized penalties, likely penalty, likelihood of a jail sentence, likelihood of future incarceration for failure to comply with courtimposed conditions, collateral consequences triggered by conviction, and degree of stigma associated with the charge. But this approach is not workable.
To assess, say, the collateral consequences of conviction for a single offense in
a single jurisdiction is challenging; to delineate a cross-jurisdictional class of
offenses with comparable “practical effects” would be near impossible. And it
might also require collecting data from disparate data sources within each jurisdiction.
We therefore arrive at our own approach: focusing on non-traffic misdemeanors tried in state court. This is partly a practical solution to a difficult data
problem. It was simply beyond our capacity to obtain comprehensive data
from all of the other low-level courts that handle some offenses designated as
misdemeanors. But this class of cases also constitutes a defensible category in
and of itself. It appears to us that most offenses designated as misdemeanors,
in most jurisdictions, are tried in state court. And within state-court misdemeanor systems, traffic offenses appear to constitute the single greatest source
of variation across jurisdictions. Once they are excluded, the residual misdemeanor caseloads exhibit some uniformity and allow for much more meaningful cross-jurisdictional comparison.
The difficulty of deciding what class of cases to analyze in order to understand the realities of low-level criminal-case processing, however, highlights a deeper question: is “misdemeanor” a useful category for scholarship at
all? In our view the answer is a qualified yes. “Misdemeanor” criminal justice—whether it is understood to encompass all cases legally designated as
such or some related set, as here—has enough coherence, and is important
enough, to warrant all the attention it has begun to receive and more. 197 But
forum in which cases are adjudicated. But, for the same reasons, this approach is also both thin and
impractical; each offense “type” suffers from the same degree of variation and ambiguity as the category of “misdemeanor” itself. How to delineate the boundaries of a category like “traffic,” “publicorder,” or “violent offense” is a highly subjective question, as is the question of which specific offenses meet whatever definition one settles on. Within each offense type, different offenses may be handled differently. And this approach would also require collecting data (for each offense type) across
fragmented data systems.
197
See supra notes 9 and 17 and accompanying text (noting various scholars who have recently
studied U.S. misdemeanor law and its consequences).
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researchers should understand that “misdemeanors” include a wide array of
both state and municipal offenses that may be subject to adjudication in multiple courts, and that the contents of this array vary from place to place. Conversely, “misdemeanors” may exclude municipal offenses that have equivalent
practical effects. Given the tremendous overlap and porous boundaries between state misdemeanor law, municipal law, and traffic law (both state and
municipal), any empirical study of misdemeanor enforcement should delineate
its unit of analysis as carefully as possible. And to truly understand low-level
law enforcement, we must ultimately study all of these systems in conjunction.
The second thing that misdemeanor researchers should bear in mind is
that different low-level offense types may serve different functions and have
essentially different characters, and that the fault lines do not necessarily align
with legal or institutional divides. Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott argue, for
instance, that “public order” offenses serve primarily as vehicles to justify the
arrests and short-term detentions that police find necessary to maintain the
peace. 198 Once the immediate threat has dissipated, conviction and punishment
are irrelevant. Offenses like theft, on the other hand, are more like codifications of traditional crimes—culpable and harmful acts—for which the punishment is the point, either because it is deserved or because the threat of punishment serves as a deterrent. To the extent that this is true, offenses that serve the
public-order role might be codified in state or municipal law, classified as misdemeanors or violations, and adjudicated in any number of possible courts,
depending on the place. As empirical analysis of misdemeanor justice gets underway, researchers should be alert to these functional differences. It may be
that we should strive to identify and analyze functional categories, rather than
the miscellaneous body of offenses held together by a word on a statute page.
The even deeper normative question is what function misdemeanors
should serve. It seems safe to say that the fuzziness of the category derives, at
least in part, from a lack of societal clarity on this point. If the purpose of the
misdemeanor classification is to designate lesser crimes—acts less serious than
felonies, but still deserving of the particular condemnation and stigma that a
criminal conviction carries—then it should include only acts that are widely
viewed as morally culpable. 199 Stretching the notion of a misdemeanor offense
198
See Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 268, 276–77 (2015), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/vol128_Gerstein
Prescott.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZW4-YCSD] (arguing that “[w]ith rare exceptions, once the very lowlevel defendant is arrested, the police have accomplished their immediate goal of maintaining order”
and are indifferent to conviction and punishment).
199
See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
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to contain both domestic assault and walking a dog without a leash creates tension. In response, criminal justice systems develop release valves that allow
some offenses to be processed in less “criminal” fashion. The uneven evolution
of this process across jurisdictions might help to explain the varied and fragmented grab bag of lower-level criminal court procedure. Whether “misdemeanor” is a legal and conceptual category that could have coherence, and
what a system of misdemeanor adjudication might look like if it did, are questions for future debate.
CONCLUSION
The empirical study of misdemeanor criminal justice presents difficult
challenges, but they are not insurmountable. This overview study offers evidence that in many respects affirms conventional wisdom about the operation
of misdemeanor systems, but in other respects calls them into question. In
highlighting variance across jurisdictions, it also raises interesting questions.
Why, for instance, are racial disparities so extreme in Chicago relative to Philadelphia? What accounts for the wide range in conviction rates from one jurisdiction to the next? Questions like these will require sustained and localized
investigation. We hope to have provided useful fodder for that work.
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APPENDIX A: EIGHT MISDEMEANOR SYSTEMS—DETAILS AND SOURCES
Houston and San Antonio, Texas
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme
● Class A—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or fine of
$4,000. 200
● Class B—punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and/or fine of
$2,000. 201
● Class C—punishable by fine up to $500, 202 and conviction “does not impose any legal disability or disadvantage.” 203 Some state-law offenses and all municipal offenses are Class C misdemeanors. 204
Municipal vs. State Law
● Counties and municipalities can and do enact ordinances or regulations
that create criminal offenses called “misdemeanors,” but they may not carry a sentence of incarceration. 205
● The Texas Penal Code prohibits counties and municipalities from criminalizing any conduct already covered by the penal code, 206 but in practice they often
do; the prohibition seems to have been interpreted simply to require that any such
offense carry precisely the same penalty as under state law. 207 Houston’s Municipal Code, for instance, just stipulates, “no penalty shall be greater or less than the
penalty provided for the same or a similar offense under the laws of the state.” 208
● Any municipal or county offense that carries a potential fine over $500
must include a mens rea element (a “culpable mental state”). 209

200

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (West 2019).
Id. § 12.22.
202
Id. § 12.23.
203
Id. § 12.03.
204
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 54.001 (West 2019); Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin,
supra note 64.
205
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 54.001; Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra
note 109.
206
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.08 (West 2019).
207
See, e.g., Letter Opinion from Rick Gilpin, Deputy Chair, Op. Comm., Office of the Attorney
Gen., Tex., to Representative René O. Oliveira, Chair, Comm. on Econ. Dev., LO98-041 (May 11,
1998) (“Penalties under ordinances, if the ordinance is the same as the state law, must conform strictly
to penalties prescribed by the state law. Such penalties cannot exceed or fall below the penalties prescribed by the state law; that is, where the ordinance pertains to the same matter as that enacted by the
Legislature.”) (quoting Ex parte Goldburg, 200 S.W. 386, 387–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918)).
208
HOUS., TEX., CODE § 1-6 (2020); see also, e.g., id. § 28-22 (providing that duplicative offenses in that chapter shall be punished “as provided in state law”).
209
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2019).
201
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● Counties can imprison individuals for non-payment of fine—receive credit
of $100 per day—although in theory this requires a determination of willful failure. 210
● In Harris County, both Houston and Pasadena have municipal codes. 211
Institutional Structure
● State courts (called County Courts at Law) adjudicate Class A and B misdemeanors, while county-run justice-of-the-piece courts and municipal courts adjudicate Class C misdemeanors. 212
● Most traffic offenses are Class C misdemeanors. This means that most traffic offenses, although they are state-law offenses, are handled in the JP and municipal courts. 213
● But DUIs and some others are Class A or B misdemeanors. 214
● Occasionally a Class C misdemeanor will be adjudicated in the County
Courts, but Class A and B misdemeanors are never adjudicated in the justice-ofthe-piece or municipal courts. 215
Summons vs. Arrest
● All Class C misdemeanor prosecutions can be initiated by summons rather
than arrest as well as some Class A and B misdemeanors (possession of 4 oz. or
210
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.09-10 (West 2019) (permitting discharge of fine through
incarceration or work); id. art. 43.091 (“A court may waive payment of all or part of a fine imposed on
a defendant if the court determines that . . . the defendant is indigent or does not have sufficient resources or income to pay all or part of the fine . . . .”); id. art. 45.203 (West 2019) (permitting municipal courts to jail individuals for non-payment of fine); see also HOUS., TEX., CODE § 16-51 (2020)
(“No person may be imprisoned because he cannot pay the full amount of the fine owed. If the defendant fails to pay an installment or refuses to pay the fine assessed, he shall be incarcerated until the
fine is fully satisfied.”); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE § 1-6 (2020) (“In all cases where a fine is imposed by or in the municipal court, in default of immediate payment thereof, the defendant shall be
imprisoned in jail, or required to work in the streets or other public works in the city, under the direction of the police, until the fine is paid, allowing fifteen dollars ($15.00) per day until the sum
amounts to that of the fine . . . .”).
211
HOUS., TEX., CODE, https://www.houstontx.gov/codes/ [https://perma.cc/HW4V-WJ83]; PASADENA, TEX., CODE, https://www.cityofpasadena.net/city-services/municipal-code/ [https://perma.
cc/4ZNR-ESAM].
212
Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 27.031 (West 2019) (defining the jurisdiction of justice courts); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 29.003
(West 2019) (defining the jurisdiction of municipal courts). County sheriffs bring cases to justice-ofthe-peace courts, whereas municipal police bring cases to municipal courts, but the offenses handled
in each court are the same. Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
213
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
214
E.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.9465 (West 2019) (sale or negligent possession of a
license plate flipper are Class A and B misdemeanors, respectively); id. § 550.024 (West 2019) (violation of duty to take responsibility for striking unattended vehicle can be Class B misdemeanor).
215
A Class C misdemeanor might wind up in the County Courts if the DA elects to downgrade a
Class A or B arrest charge, or if it arises from the same incident as Class A or B charges and thus is
filed concomitantly. Justice-of-the-peace and municipal courts, conversely, lack jurisdiction to hear
Class A and B cases. Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
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less of marijuana or synthetic marijuana, graffiti, petty theft, contraband in a correctional facility and driving with an invalid license). 216
● There do not appear to be any offenses for which a summons, rather than
arrest, is mandatory.
● For eligible Class A and B misdemeanors, the DA usually makes the decision as to whether to cite and release. 217 The law itself suggests that the decision is
within law enforcement’s discretion, 218 but as a practical matter it is necessary for
both the DA and the court to agree to a citation (in order to give the person a court
date), and the DA tends to be the deciding vote.
● Class C cases are generally initiated by ticket. People do sometimes get arrested, however, if they have an outstanding warrant for a previous failure-toappear or unpaid fine. 219
Pretrial Custody
● Texas is a “right-to-bail” state—the Texas Constitution includes a right to
bail for non-capital defendants. 220
● Bail bondsmen are prevalent. 221
Pretrial Process
● Texas law requires the DA to file an “information” to formally initiate
prosecution in Class A and B cases. 222 This may not always happen in practice. 223
● Detained misdemeanor defendants must be tried within thirty days for a
Class A charge, within fifteen days for a Class B charge, and within five days for a
Class C charge. 224 If the information has not been filed and the state is not ready
by the deadline, the defendant must be released. 225
Houston (Harris County)

216

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06 (West 2019).
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
218
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06(b)–(c).
219
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
220
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.07 (West 2019); see also TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2019) (articulating considerations for bail-setting); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03 (West 2019) (providing for personal bonds in lieu of bail).
221
Cf. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704. et seq. (West 2019) (providing regulations for bail bondsmen).
222
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 17; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.04 (West 2019); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.01 (West 2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.018; 23 TEX. JURISPRUDENCE 3D Criminal Procedure: Pretrial Proceedings §§ 567, 634, Westlaw (database updated
Jan. 2020); 4A TEX. JURISPRUDENCE Pleading & Practice Forms § 84:74, Westlaw (2d ed., database
updated Nov. 2019).
223
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
224
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (West 2019).
225
Id.
217
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● There are sixteen County Courts at Law that hear Class A and B misdemeanor cases. 226
● The DA prosecutes all classes of misdemeanors.
● A central administrative office handles calendaring for all misdemeanors,
which means that, relative to other counties (like Bexar), case scheduling is relatively efficient and consistent across the sixteen courts. 227
● In the County Courts at Law, each charge is filed and treated as an independent “case”; a person who is arrested on multiple charges will have multiple
cases, and each charge/case is generally adjudicated separately. 228
● Houston had a bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses during the period
our data covers.
● People charged with Class A and/or B charges, if they have sufficient
funds, can be released from the police station. A person who cannot immediately
post bail as provided for on the schedule will appear in front of a magistrate within
twenty-four hours. This includes anyone arrested on a Class C charge, although
Class C cases are handled on a separate docket.
● An ADA is always on call to make charging decisions. Arresting officers
promptly call the DA’s office to report an arrest, and an ADA determines whether
or not to “take” the charges. The DA staffs this role twenty-four hours a day. 229
● The efficiency of charging in Harris County facilitates defendants’ quick
release because almost immediately after arrest each defendant (for whom the DA
accepts charges) has both formal charges and a case number.
● Between 2011–2016, no defense representation for the indigent was provided at bail hearings.
● With respect to adjudication, there is no right to counsel for Class C misdemeanors and virtually everyone proceeds pro se. For Class A and B misdemeanors, between 2011–2016, the Public Defender represented only those with severe
mental illness, a very limited set. All other indigent defendants were appointed
counsel from a rotating wheel. 230
● As of 2016, the DA offers diversion for first-time possession of marijuana. 231
226
See HARRIS COUNTY COURTS, http://www.ccl.hctx.net/ [https://perma.cc/DP9K-R3KB] (listing courts in Harris County).
227
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
228
Id.
229
Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64.
230
Id.
231
See Danny Clemens, Everything You Need to Know About Harris Co.’s New Pot Policy, ABC
13 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Mar. 2, 2017), https://abc13.com/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-harriscos-pot-policy/1757801 [https://perma.cc/W6TV-M8NN] (reporting that the new Misdemeanor Marijuana Diversion Program “will divert all misdemeanor marijuana cases . . . instead redirecting lowlevel drug offenders into a decision-making class”).
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San Antonio (Bexar County)
● There are fifteen County Courts at Law that hear Class A and B misdemeanor cases as well as specialized court programs (including DWI Court, Veterans Treatment Court, Mental Health Court, and Adult Drug Court). 232
● San Antonio has an extensive municipal code that includes many offens233
es.
● San Antonio police reportedly do not ever issue summons for misdemeanor charges. 234
● There is no ADA on call to accept/reject arrest charges. This can result in
long delays in the filing of formal charges. 235
● As in Houston, each charge is filed and treated as an independent case.236
● Magistrates make probable-cause determinations as well as bail.
● Before 2014, the Public Defender only handled mental-health cases, but
the office has since expanded. 237
● For indigent cases beyond the Public Defender’s capacity, private attorneys are appointed from a wheel. 238
● Each County Court handles its own calendar, so there is reportedly quite a
bit of variation in case timing across the fifteen courts. 239
● Diversion functions much like deferred adjudication: the Court takes a
guilty plea but sets sentencing out a year and, if the defendant complies with all
conditions imposed, the plea is never entered. Approximately 25% of all San Antonio misdemeanor cases are reportedly channeled into diversion. 240
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme
● First degree—punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and/or fine of
$10,000. 241
● Second degree—punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment and/or fine
of $5,000. 242

232
Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109; see also BEXAR
COUNTY COURTS, https://www.bexar.org/1055/County-Courts [https://perma.cc/WQT2-NL5C] (listing
courts in Bexar County).
233
E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE §§ 7-10, 26-20 (2020) (stating the penalties for violations of
the provisions relating to cemeteries and air pollution).
234
Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109.
235
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
236
Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109.
240
Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109.
241
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(b)(6), 1101(4) (West 2019).
242
Id. §§ 106(b)(7), 1101(5).
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● Third degree—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or fine of
$2,500. 243
● Summary offense—punishable by up to ninety days’ imprisonment and/or
fine up to $300. 244
● Note: Misdemeanors are more serious than in other jurisdictions and more
low-level offenses are codified as summary offenses. Far fewer traffic offenses are
codified as state-law misdemeanors than other jurisdictions (only thirty-six, as
opposed to more than one hundred in Texas, Illinois, and Virginia), and none in the
Penal Code.
Municipal vs. State Law
● Cities “of the first class,” of which Philadelphia is the only one, can create
criminal offenses punishable by up to $2,300 and/or ninety days’ imprisonment. 245
● Philadelphia’s Municipal Code (the Philadelphia Code) includes offenses
designated “summary offenses,” 246 “misdemeanors,” 247 and “violations,” 248 but
these variations in terminology do not seem to carry any particular legal meaning.
● The Philadelphia Code also includes three classes of violations: Class I
(maximum fine is $300), Class II (maximum fine is $1,000), and Class III (maximum fine is $2,000). 249
● It appears that the Philadelphia Code includes some forty offenses that are
punishable by imprisonment, 250 and that the maximum possible penalty for any
Code offense is ninety days’ imprisonment and a fine of $2,000. 251
Institutional Structure
● State misdemeanors and jailable traffic offenses are handled in Municipal
Court (in the Criminal Justice Center) on a daily basis. 252

243

Id. §§ 106(b)(8), 1101(6).
Id. §§ 106(c), 1101(7) (West 2019).
245
8 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3321 (West 2019) (authorizing boroughs to prescribe
fines and penalties); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West 2019) (defining a first class
city as one whose population is one million people or greater); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 13131 (authorizing cities of the first class).
246
E.g., PHILA., PA., CODE, § 10-1105 (2020) (stating that violators of Philadelphia’s obscenity
provisions are “guilty of a summary offense”).
247
E.g., id. § 10-115 (stating that a violation of Philadelphia’s dog and cat sterilization provisions
is a Class III offense).
248
E.g., id. §§ 4A-501, 4A-601 (stating provisions governing city violations and their ensuing
penalties).
249
Id. § 1-109.
250
See id. §§ 3-103, 6-103, 6-400, 6-600, 9-105, 9-200, 9-400, 9-600, 9-900, 9-1000, 9-1100, 91600, 9-2100, 9-3200, 9-3500, 10-109, 10-115, 10-200, 10-300, 10-500, 10-600, 10-800, 10-900, 101100, 10-1500, 10-2200, 12-800, 12-900, 12-1100, 12-2400, 12-2600, 12-2900, 13-300, 18-200, 191800, 19-2600, 19-2800, 21-1000.
251
Id. § 1-109; e.g., id. § 6-103 (subjecting violators of the city’s health code to imprisonment for
a maximum of ninety days).
244
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● The same court has special days for non-jailable traffic and summary offenses. 253
Summons vs. Arrest
● Pennsylvania law directs police to issue a summons for any 2nd/3rd degree
misdemeanor or 1st degree DUI unless there is reason to believe that the person
will not appear or poses a threat. 254
● Interviews suggest that Philadelphia practice does not reflect this statutory
mandate. Interviewees report that the Philadelphia police do not arrest for ordinance violations; they instead issue tickets or “code violation notices.”255 But Philadelphia police reportedly do arrest for nearly all misdemeanors except first possession of marijuana. 256
Pretrial Custody
● Magistrates may set bail, 257 though there is no state-constitutional right to
bail, and bail can be denied if “no condition or combination of conditions other
than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident or presumption great.” 258
● Philadelphia operates a “deposit” program: Defendants can obtain release
by posting 10% of the total bail amount with the court, most of which is recoverable at the conclusion of the case if the accused appears for court. 259 This deposit
program has limited the role of bail bondsmen, although defendants may still seek
a loan from a bond agent if they are unable to procure the full deposit amount.
Pretrial Process
● Upon arrest, Philadelphia police take the arrestee to the police holding cell,
where he or she is fingerprinted. The police write a preliminary arrest report

252
Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72; see also PA. R. CRIM. P. § 1001 (defining “Municipal Court case”).
253
Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72. Prior to 2016, a separate Traffic Court
adjudicated non-jailable traffic offenses, but that court has been dissolved and replaced by the Municipal Court Traffic Division. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102, 325, 1121, 1127, 1302,
1321 (West 2019) (establishing scheme for hearing traffic cases in Philadelphia); S.B. 334, 2013–
2014 Reg. Sess., P.L. 55, No. 17 (Pa. 2013) (creating the Traffic Court of Philadelphia).
254
PA. R. CRIM. P. §§ 509, 519, 1003(C) (West 2019).
255
See, e.g., Permits, Violations & Licenses, CITY OF PHILA., https://beta.phila.gov/services/
permits-violations-licenses [https://perma.cc/WXM4-HUZ3] (providing information on different permits, violations, and licenses available in the city of Philadelphia).
256
Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, supra note 110; Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72.
257
PA. R. CRIM. P. § 523 (West 2019) (bail-setting criteria); id. § 528 (West 2019) (directing
court to consider release criteria in Rule 523 and ability to pay).
258
PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also PA. R. CRIM. P. §§ 520, 521 (West 2019) (procedures for
ordering detention).
259
PA. R. CRIM. P. § 528.
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(PARS), which is sent to the DA’s office. The DA determines which formal charges, if any, to file. 260
● Arraignment is generally held within eighteen hours of arrest. The PARS is
provided to defense counsel. Interviewees report that the formal charges ultimately
filed will frequently differ from the PARS charges. 261
Adjudication
● Philadelphia misdemeanor defendants may waive their right to a jury trial
in favor of an expedited bench trial, which many do. The dominant form of bench
trial is a “negotiated stipulated trial.” This is really a modified guilty plea. 262 The
remaining defendants in the waiver program have a more standard bench trial.
Such trials typically take less than an hour and involve only a few witnesses (police officers in drug cases, complainants in assault cases, and loss-prevention officers in theft cases). 263 A defendant who is convicted retains the right to a de novo
jury trial, but few defendants pursue this option, because sentences imposed after a
jury trial are thought to be considerably harsher than those imposed by the waiver
judges.
● Philadelphia operates a broad array of formal misdemeanor diversion programs, including programs for nonviolent first-time offenders, for repeat offenders
with underlying addiction or mental health problems, for veterans and for people
charged with first-offense DUI. 264 Since 2011, the system has funneled approximately 20% of all misdemeanor arrests into one of these diversion programs (the
Accelerated Misdemeanor Program, or AMP). 265
● Deferred adjudication is also a possible disposition, at the DA’s discretion.
This involves a no-contest plea that is held in abatement until the person completes, or fails to complete, the conditions imposed. 266

260

Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, supra note 110.
Id.
262
The defendant does not admit guilt, but the outcome of the trial is negotiated in advance. The
DA either moves the police report into evidence or reads minimal facts into the record. The judge then
determines that the defendant is guilty. Usually the sentence is negotiated in advance, but sometimes it
is left open and the parties make sentencing arguments to the judge.
263
“Protracted” trials that involve multiple witnesses or interpreters are held in a special protracted-trial room.
264
See generally DEREK RIKER, PHILA. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS (undated and unpublished) (on file with authors); Telephone Interview with Derek Riker,
supra note 110.
265
This program, which began in 2011, is for nonviolent first-time offenders. A defendant can
avoid conviction by completing the program requirements, which takes approximately five weeks. A
newer program, AMP2, targets people who cycle through the system because of underlying drug addiction or mental health issues. This program is more customized than AMP1 and takes several
months to complete. It involves intensive conditions and social services support.
266
Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, supra note 110.
261
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● In 2014, Philadelphia revised its city code to define possession of less than
thirty grams of marijuana as a summary civil offense punishable by a fine of twenty-five dollars. 267 Marijuana arrests have plummeted since. 268
● In 2017, a former civil rights attorney, Larry Krasner, was elected as DA
on a reform platform. Among other reform commitments, he has avowed to “end[]
cash bail” in Philadelphia. 269
Chicago, Illinois
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme
● Class A—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or a $2,500 fi270
ne.
● Class B—punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and/or a $1,500
fine. 271
● Class C—punishable by up to thirty days’ imprisonment and/or a $1,500
272
fine.
● All misdemeanors can be probated for a maximum of two years. 273
● Petty offenses—punishable by up to 6 months of probation or conditions
pursuant to conditional discharge and/or a fine of $1,000. 274
● Business offenses—Punishable by a fine, conditional discharge, or supervision as specified by individual offense statutes. 275
Municipal vs. State Law
● Municipalities can criminalize the same conduct as the state but may not
enact ordinances that are preempted by state regulation or that “infringe upon the
spirit of the state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state.” 276
267
PHILA., PA., CODE § 10-2102 (2020); Relaxed Marijuana Law in Effect in Philly, NBC PHILA.
(Oct. 19, 2014), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/relaxed-marijuana-law-in-effect-inphilly-monday/83496/ [https://perma.cc/FMT3-S7S6].
268
Anna Orso, Marijuana Arrests Down 75 Percent Since Philly Decriminalized, BILLYPENN
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://billypenn.com/2017/10/24/marijuana-arrests-down-75-percent-since-phillydecriminalized/ [https://perma.cc/GYH6-9WZA]; Telephone Interview with Derek Riker, supra note
110. But see Sam Wood et al., Despite Marijuana’s Increasing Legalization and Acceptance, Arrests
Soar, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/weed-marijuanalegalization-arrests-pennsylvania-new-jersey-african-american-20181004.html-2 [https://perma.cc/
L63E-B42B] (observing a contrasting trend of increased marijuana possession arrests in Philadelphia
suburbs).
269
See Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a Progressive D.A. Tests the Power—and Learns the Limits—
of His Office, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/larrykrasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-progressive.html [https://perma.cc/B2E5-6XC5] (noting that
during his campaign for DA, Larry Krasner supported eliminating cash bail, decriminalizing low-level
offenses, and monitoring “police and prosecutorial misconduct”).
270
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2019).
271
Id. 5/5-4.5-60.
272
Id. 5/5-4.5-65.
273
Id. 5/5-4.5-65, -60, -65.
274
Id. 5/5-4.5-75.
275
Id. 5/5-4.5-80.
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● Municipalities can impose misdemeanor penalties of up to six months’ incarceration and a fine of up to $750. 277
● Chicago’s Municipal Code appears to have fifty-two of these offenses, including failure to appear at a hearing, 278 impersonating a fireman, 279 drug offenses, 280 public nuisance, 281 gang loitering, 282 and abandonment of refrigerators. 283
Summons vs. Arrest
● Police may issue a summons rather than arrest for any misdemeanor. 284
Pretrial Custody
● The Illinois Constitution provides for preventive pretrial detention of capital defendants, defendants facing life sentences, and felony defendants facing a
mandatory prison sentence if the court, after a hearing, determines that release
“would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of any person.” 285
● Other defendants are bailable.
● The issuance of bail is governed by the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. 286
Cook County
● The Circuit Court of Cook County is comprised of six districts—Chicago
(First District) and five suburban districts. 287
● State-law misdemeanors
276
Vill. of Northfield v. BP Am., Inc., 933 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see Pesticide
Pub. Policy Found. v. Vill. of Wauconda, 510 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ill. 1987) (when “the legislature enacts a comprehensive scheme of regulation, the legislature implies by the scheme that there is no room
for additional regulation by local government units”). In determining whether local law conflicts with
pre-established state law, the courts look to legislative intent.
277
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-2-1.1 (West 2009).
278
CHI., ILL., CODE § 1-4-145(b) (2019).
279
Id. § 2-36-840.
280
E.g., id. §§ 7-24-091, -092, -093, -094, -098.
281
Id. § 7-28-060 (stating that violators of the public nuisance provision “shall be subject to a
penalty of not less than $200.00 nor more than $500.00, or imprisonment not to exceed 10 days, or
both such fine and imprisonment for each offense”).
282
Id. § 8-4-015(e-f) (stating that violators of the gang loitering provision “[are] subject to a fine
of not less than $100.00 and not more than $500.00 for each offense, or imprisonment for not more
than six months for each offense, or both. A second or subsequent offense shall be punishable by a
mandatory minimum sentence of not less than five days imprisonment. . . . Any person who violates
an order issued by a court under this subsection (f) shall be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence
of not less than five days imprisonment but not more than six months imprisonment”).
283
Id. § 7-28-040.
284
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/107-11, -12 (West 2019); see also Illinois v. Fitzpatrick, 986
N.E.2d 1163, 1168–69 (Ill. 2013) (clarifying that the police may, but are not required, to issue a summons rather than an arrest).
285
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; 725 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-6.1(c)(1)(A) (procedures for preventive detention).
286
See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 501–590; see also Illinois Supreme Court Issues Substantial Rule Changes, supra note 74.
287
Organization of the Circuit Court, CIR. COURT OF COOK CTY., http://www.cookcountycourt.
org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OrganizationoftheCircuitCourt.aspx [https://perma.cc/N2VJ-SQ2J].
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o Handled in a series of courts in the First District: Traffic offenses (including DUI and driving on a suspended or revoked license, which
carry a potential jail sentence) are handled in the Dailey Center if the
defendant is in custody and in the Criminal Court (Layton Building)
if the defendant is not. Domestic violence cases are handled in court
at 555 West Harrison Street. Other misdemeanors are handled in five
“Branch courtrooms” (Cook County courtrooms are hosted in police
department buildings).
o The DA prosecutes all state-law misdemeanors.
o The DA offers diversion for first-time possession of marijuana.
o The Public Defender represents indigent defendants charged with
Class A, B, and C misdemeanors, which constitute the vast majority
of defendants.
● Municipal misdemeanors
o Labeled as “ordinance violations” and include conduct such as improper lane usage and littering. Most are punishable by fine only.
o Municipal traffic offenses are handled in the “minor traffic rooms” at
the Dailey Center. Other municipal offenses are handled in the
Branch courtrooms.
o Corporation Council (the City Attorney) prosecutes municipal offenses.
o Defendants are typically unrepresented, because there is no right to
representation, but the Public Defender will represent a defendant if
her charge is related to a higher-level case.
o The city has transferred many of the municipal cases to an administrative hearing process outside of criminal court. 288
● Cook County provides indigent defense representation at bail hearings.
● Most misdemeanor defendants are released on I-bonds (ROR). In some
cases, magistrates impose D-bonds (deposit bonds) that require the defendant to
pay a 10% deposit to be released, or “full bonds” that must be paid in full. 289
● Possible dispositions
o Conviction
o Acquittal
o “Supervision” (deferred adjudication): The defendant proffers a
guilty plea, but sentencing is set for some time in the future. If the
defendant complies with all conditions of supervision, it is “terminat-

288
289

Telephone Interview with Mike Morrissey, supra note 64.
Telephone Interview with Alexa Van Brunt, supra note 111.
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ed satisfactorily” and no conviction is ever entered. If not, the guilty
plea is entered and the defendant is sentenced. 290
o “Conditional discharge” (conviction unaccompanied by either jail or
probation).
o “Stricken off with leave to reinstate” (dismissal).
● The city of Chicago and state of Illinois have enacted marijuana decriminalization measures that have reduced rates of marijuana arrests over the last few
years. 291
Kentucky
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme
● Class A—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or fine of $500
(for individuals), or $10,000 (corporations).
● Class B—punishable by up to ninety days’ imprisonment and/or fine of
$250 (for individuals), or $5,000 (corporations).
● Violations—punishable by a $250 fine. 292
● Fines are mandatory, except for indigent persons or for offenses defined
outside the penal code that specifically prohibit levying fines. 293
Municipal vs. State Law
● Kentucky permits counties and municipalities to create municipal offenses,
either misdemeanors or violations, which must be punishable according to the
same scheme as in state law. 294
● Municipal offenses that are duplicative of state-law offenses must carry the
same penalty as under state law. 295
● The Louisville Municipal Code appears to include at least nine offenses
punishable by incarceration, but these are rarely prosecuted. 296
Institutional Structure
● District Court has jurisdiction over both state-law and municipal misdemeanors. 297
● County attorney prosecutes both (all criminal offenses). 298
290

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-70, -75.
Frank Main, Marijuana Arrests in Chicago Plummet, but Blacks Are ‘Vast Majority’ of Cases,
CHI. SUN TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/cannabis/marijuana-arrests-enforcementchicago-police-declines-possession-blacks-african-americans-most-often-charged-ticketed-cannabisweed-watchdogs/ [https://perma.cc/8G2Y-MK26] (discussing the decrease in marijuana-related arrests as
a result of the decriminalization of marijuana).
292
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.090 (West 2019), 534.040 (West 2019).
293
Id. § 534.040.
294
Id. § 83A.065(2) (West 2019).
295
Id. § 83A.065(5).
296
See LOUISVILLLE, KY., CODE Tit. XIII (listing general offenses); Telephone Interview with
Melanie Foote, supra note 112.
297
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.110 (West 2019), 83A.065.
298
Id. § 83A.065.
291
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● Statewide public defender agency (the Kentucky Department of Public
Advocacy) provides indigent defense representation. 299
Summons vs. Arrest
● Kentucky law directs police to issue citations rather than arrest for any
misdemeanor, so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person
being cited will appear to answer the charge. 300
Pretrial Custody
● Kentucky is a right-to-bail state. Its constitution provides that prisoners
have the right to bail unless there is sufficient evidence or presumption of a capital
offense. 301
● Kentucky abolished for-profit bail bonding in 1976. 302
● Arrestees are taken to the jail, where they are interviewed by the pretrial
release agency. Pretrial Release relays its recommendation to an on-call judge,
who sets bond. If the bond is ROR or unsecured, the person is released from jail
with a date to return to court. If the judge sets cash bail, which can be partially
secured (usually at 10% of the full amount) or required to be paid in full, then that
amount must be paid at the courthouse or jail (if the jail in question accepts cash
bail payments) for the person to be released. People who do not post bond are detained until arraignment, usually held within twenty-four hours of arrest, where a
detainee can ask for a lawyer and a lower bond. 303
● The Public Defender does its best to provide defense representation at arraignment. 304
● The maximum cash bail amount for misdemeanors is $500. 305
● Kentucky’s Pretrial Release agency uses a risk assessment tool to assess
the likelihood that an arrestee will fail to appear or be rearrested if released pending trial. 306

299
Who We Are, DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KY.GOV, https://dpa.ky.gov/who_we_are/Pages/
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z34B-6FTQ].
300
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (West 2019).
301
KY. CONST. § 16.
302
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510(1); see also Stephens v. Bonding Ass’n of Ky., 538 S.W.2d
580, 581, 584 (Ky. 1976) (confirming that the Kentucky legislature’s abolishment of commercial bail
bonding in 1976 is constitutional).
303
Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112; Telephone Interview with Jacob
Johnson, supra note 120.
304
Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120.
305
Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112.
306
See Thanithia Billings, Note, Private Interest, Public Sphere: Eliminating the Use of Commercial Bail Bondsmen in the Criminal Justice System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1337, 1356–57 (2016) (noting
that Kentucky courts use a pretrial program to determine defendants’ eligibility for bond by looking at
“factors such as: flight risk, likelihood of the defendant to appear in court, and likelihood to be a danger to others”).
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● Kentucky Supreme Court Order 2016-10 implemented the “Non-Financial
Uniform Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program” statewide. The order
requires District Courts to release, via ROR, nearly all those arrested on nonviolent, non-sexual, non-DUI misdemeanors who score as low-risk on the risk assessment scale. 307
Adjudication
● All misdemeanors—state-law offenses and municipal offenses, traffic and
non-traffic—are handled in District Court, along with many other kinds of cases
(including disability hearings, juvenile status offenses, and child custody and support hearings). Many traffic offenses are misdemeanors; they carry potential jail
sentences and thus the right to defense representation. Most traffic cases are
scheduled on special “traffic dockets.” 308
● The County Attorney prosecutes all cases in District Court. 309
● Prosecutors do not typically make an independent charging decision at the
start of the case. Cases are initiated on the basis of arrest charges. 310
● A public defender should be appointed for the indigent for any offense
where the person is at “risk of loss of liberty” (which includes the risk of being
held in contempt of court). 311
● The proportion of cases handled by the Public Defender varies by county.
In Harden County, the Public Defender handles approximately 90% of the docket,
but in other counties it may be less. 312
● Non-guilt dispositions 313
o Acquittal
o Dismissal (sometimes “dismissed/merged” if only some charges are
dismissed as part of a plea deal)
o Dismissal on conditions
o Deferred prosecution, also called “in-court diversion” or “in-court
mediation” (if the defendant abides by the conditions imposed for the
stipulated time period, the case is dismissed)

307
Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program, No. 2016-10, (Ky.), https://kycourts.gov/courts/supreme/Rules_Procedures/201610.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QN2R-UR5Y]; see also Scott B. West, The Next Step in Pretrial Release Is Here: The Administrative Release Program, THE ADVOC., (Pub. Defs. Prot. & Advocacy, Frankfort, Ky.), Jan.
2017, at 1, https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender_Resources/The%20Advocate/Advocate%20News
letter%20Jan%202017%20(COLOR%20-%20FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/47EY-DFL2] (discussing
the Non-Financial Administrative Release Program).
308
Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112.
309
Id.; Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120.
310
Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120.
311
Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112.
312
Id.
313
Id.; Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120.

1042

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:971

o Diversion (like deferred prosecution, but requires a plea of guilty
without any sentencing)
● A typical misdemeanor sentence will include some jail time with credit for
time served, the remainder suspended, and two years of probation (the maximum
allowable period of probation for a misdemeanor). 314
● In Boone County, prosecutors are often willing to amend charges down, or
allow a person charged with multiple offenses to plead to the least serious charge
only. Prosecutors are less willing to agree to either type of plea in Grant County.
People do not plead to non-criminal violations. 315
● Diversion is commonly offered to first-time offenders charged with nonviolent, non-DUI offenses. 316
Virginia
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme
● Class 1—punishable by up to one year of imprisonment and/or fine of
$2,500.
● Class 2—punishable by up to six months of imprisonment and/or fine of
$1,000.
● Class 3—punishable by fine up to $500.
● Class 4—punishable by fine up to $250. 317
● “Traffic infractions are violations of public order as defined in § 46.2-100
and not deemed to be criminal in nature.” 318
Institutional Structure
● Circuit courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors. 319
o Each charge is docketed as a separate case. 320
● District courts have jurisdiction over ordinance violations and “[a]ll other
misdemeanors and traffic infractions arising in such county . . . .” 321
● The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond has jurisdiction over “cases of
offenses committed in Capitol Square . . . .” 322
Municipal vs. State Law
● Municipalities can independently criminalize and prosecute the same conduct that constitute state misdemeanors, but penalties cannot exceed state-law pen314

Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112.
Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120.
316
Id.
317
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (2019).
318
Id. §§ 18.2-8; 46.2-100 (2019) (providing motor-vehicle-related definitions).
319
Id. §§ 16.1-126; 17.1-513 (2019).
320
Telephone Interview with Nicole Galioto, supra note 109.
321
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-123.1.
322
Id. § 18.2-124. Capitol Square is an area consisting of “monuments, memorials, and buildings”
surrounding the Virginia State Capitol. Capitol Square—VA, CULTURAL LANDSCAPE FOUND.,
https://tclf.org/landscapes/capitol-square [https://perma.cc/V2A6-WR27].
315

2020]

Misdemeanors by the Numbers

1043

alties for “like” offenses (and cannot exceed the penalties for a Class 1 misdemeanor). 323
● For instance, under the Fairfax County Municipal Code, Class 1 and Class
2 misdemeanors are punishable as under state law, by jail time, and/or a fine. 324
Summons vs. Arrest
● Any misdemeanor is eligible for citation rather than arrest. 325
● Virginia law directs law enforcement officers to cite rather than arrest for
all Class 3 and 4 misdemeanors and for some Class 1 and 2 offenses if certain
conditions are met. 326
Pretrial Custody
● The Virginia Constitution prohibits excessive bail, but does not explicitly
either affirm or disclaim a right to bail. 327
● Statutory law and Supreme Court rules govern pretrial custody determinations. 328
Adjudication
● Defendants charged with jailable offenses may opt out of representation by
accepting a deferred adjudication early in the case. 329
● Deferred adjudication requires the defendant to avoid arrest for six
months. For some offenses there are additional conditions; deferred adjudication
for possession of marijuana, for instance, entails a mandatory six-month suspension of the defendant’s driver’s license. If a defendant avoids arrest and complies
with any other condition imposed, the charge is dismissed.

323

VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1429 (2019).
FAIRFAX CTY., VA., CODE § 1-1-14 (2020).
325
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-73 (2019).
326
Id. § 19.2-74.
327
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
328
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-119–152.7 (providing bail and recognizances provisions); VA.
SUP. CT. R. 5A:2 (providing rules for pre- and post-trial bail orders).
329
Telephone Interview with Nicole Galioto, supra note 109 (reporting that “a lot of times” people charged with first-time possession of marijuana take this path).
324
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APPENDIX B: OFFENSE GROUPINGS
The following chart enumerates the specific offense categories we included in each of the seven main misdemeanor offense classes that we use as the
basis of our analysis. 330
Drugs
● Drug distribution offenses
● Possession of controlled substances,
drug paraphernalia
DUI
● Driving-while-intoxicated
Public-Order
● Begging/panhandling
● Disorderly conduct
● Lewdness
● Loitering offenses
● Mob action
● Noise offenses
● Obstructing justice
● Obstruction of public ways
● Offenses related to substance use
(excluding DUI and licensing offenses; including public intoxication)
● Prostitution
● Resisting arrest
● Riding bicycle on sidewalk
● Trespass
Theft
● Burglary offenses
● Embezzlement offenses
● Fraud offenses (including providing
false identification or making a false report)
● Possession or receipt of stolen property
● Theft-of-property offenses
● Theft-of-services offenses (including
fare evasion)
Traffic
● Driving on a revoked or suspended
license
● No insurance
● Reckless driving
● Speeding
● Violation of equipment requirements
● Violation of other traffic rules

Violent
● Assault offenses
● Battery offenses
● Endangerment offenses
● False imprisonment
● Manslaughter (Philadelphia only;
classified as a felony elsewhere)
● Threat offenses
● Violation of a protective order
Other
● Failure to provide identification
● Gang contact
● Gambling offenses
● Harassment
● Hit-and-run offenses
● Interference with emergency calls or
services
● Littering
● Offenses related to the administration
of justice (i.e. failure to appear in court, violation of bail bond condition, contempt of court,
hindering prosecution)
● Offenses related to animals
● Offenses related to minors
● Possession of burglary tools or
“criminal instruments”
● Property damage offenses (including
graffiti and “criminal mischief”)
● Regulatory offenses (an extremely
varied category)
● Sex-related offenses (not including
prostitution or public urination)
● Undecipherable offenses
● Weapons offenses (unlawful possession or carrying)

330
For more details on our offense-grouping methodology, see supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.

